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Abstract
The growth of payday lending markets during the last 15 years has been the focus
of substantial regulatory attention both here and abroad, producing a dizzying array of
initiatives by federal and state policymakers. Those initiatives have conflicting purposes
– some seek to remove barriers to entry and others seek to impose limits on the business.
As is often the case in banking markets, the resulting patchwork of federal and state laws
poses a problem when one state is able to dictate the practices of a national industry.
For most of this industry’s life, just that has happened – the ability of lenders to take
advantage of the laws of the least restrictive States has effectively displaced the laws of
more restrictive States. Recently, however, significant changes in the policies of federal
regulators have limited the ability of lenders to “export” less restrictive laws. Now,
States can effectively police payday lenders in their borders for the first time.
Yet as we enter an era in which States will be able to regulate payday lending
effectively, there has been little clear analysis of how they should do so. This paper
responds by providing a detailed explanation of the business models and regulatory
regimes that exist today, together with a framework of options designed to implement
various perspectives regulators might adopt. We emphasize three main points. The first
is the unusual nature of payday lending, with very high interest rates accruing against
necessarily limited debt amounts. Unlike other consumer lending products such as credit
cards, the payday loan amount does not increase over time, but the biweekly interest
obligation can lead to a semi-permanent cash annuity for the lender. Second, we
underscore the limitations of existing legal regimes, which often leave loopholes that
permit lenders to avoid the statutory framework; this is a particularly serious problem
for the majority of States that have tried to limit rollover lending. Third, addressing the
majority of jurisdictions that have not banned payday lending, we advocate a reversal of
the current hostility to market activity by large institutions. If the market is to exist, we
believe it is better for it to be populated by highly visible national providers than by
smaller “mom and pop” providers.
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JUST UNTIL PAYDAY
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulating lenders that offer credit to consumers with impaired credit histories is
a tricky business. Consumers want access to credit, lenders want to charge high interest
rates to offset relatively high transaction costs and loss ratios, and policy analysts and
lawmakers want to protect consumers from foolish behavior, high interest rates, and
abusive practices.

The spirit of the market is captured by a recent Cash America

television advertisement advising that “some things can’t wait until payday.” 1 In the
current market, banks generally refuse to make the short term, risky loans many of these
consumers seek, but “fringe” credit providers have risen up in their place, at least some of
which engage in deceptive and abusive practices that violate existing law. As the market
grows, it becomes ever clearer that the existing regulatory framework is inadequate.
This Article provides a careful look at the difficulties of regulating the most
prominent and rapidly growing of these fringe providers—payday lenders.

Payday

lenders offer short term loans at high interest rates to consumers with impaired credit
histories. In a typical transaction, a customer writes a check to the payday lender for a
relatively small sum, such as $230, dating the check for the date of the customer’s next
paycheck, perhaps fourteen days later.

In exchange, the payday lender gives the

customer $200 in cash immediately. On the date of the customer’s paycheck, the payday
lender collects its loan by depositing the postdated check. The duration, amount, and fee
all can differ from provider to provider, but as a general rule, the loans are small, the

1

Cash America Television Advertisement (Sept. 7, 2006).
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repayment period is short, and the annualized interest rate is high. In this example, with a
fee of $30 for a two-week loan of $200, the annual interest rate is almost 400%.
The high interest rates that payday lenders charge have generated a flurry of
critical proposals, ranging from calls to end payday lending altogether to proposals for
additional disclosures by payday lenders. 2 The existing academic literature, however,
lacks a frank assessment of the complex regulatory problems that payday lending
presents. Scholars calling for intrusive regulation or outright prohibition of payday
lending have skipped over the step of explaining precisely what it is about this market
that is so offensive as to justify prohibition or regulation. High interest rates standing
alone are not a sufficient basis for regulatory intervention. Thus, our starting point is that
a sensible scheme of regulation must rest on some determination that the transactions
involve market failures, that the business externalizes costs to the rests of society, or that
the transactions offend social norms or justice in some other way. 3
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E.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 997 (2006);
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REGULATION 121 (2004); Diane Hellwig,
Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the Consumer Credit Market
Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567 (2005); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans:
Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002); Susan Lorde Martin &
Nancy White Huckins, Consumer Advocates vs. the Rent-To-Own Industry: Reaching a
Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 385 (1997); Therese Wilson, The Inadequacy of
the Current Regulatory Response to Payday Lending, 32 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 159, 161 (2004);
Michael Bertics, Note, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank Involvement, 9
N.C. BANKING INST. 133 (2005); Charles A. Bruch, Comment, Taking the Pay Out of Payday
Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday
Lenders, 69. U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2001); L. Blaylock Moss, Note, Modern Day Loan Sharking:
Deferred Presentment Transactions & the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1732 (2000);
Carmen M. Butler & Niloufar A. Park, Mayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Responsibility
Save Payday Lenders?, 3 RUTGERS J. L. & URB. POL’Y 119 (2005).
3

So, for example, discussions often focus on the concern that payday lenders might target
insular groups, such as minorities, immigrants, or military service people. Payday borrowing by
the military has been a hot topic since an August 2006 DoD report estimated that as many as 17%
of military personnel use payday loans. See Department of Defense, Report on Predatory
Lending Practices Directed at Members of the Armed Forces and Their Dependents (Aug. 9,
2006). Military personnel have low salaries, and thus are persistently cash-poor. They are

2

We also think that regulation cannot proceed sensibly without a rich
understanding of the economics of the market, including information about the business
model and the competitive structure of the industry. Most of the existing literature
focuses on a single obvious problem with the product – the high price – without
considering the product’s business and regulatory context. Accordingly, in Part II we
attempt to craft a realistic assessment of the business model, competitive structure, and
regulatory environment of the existing industry. We draw on existing empirical studies,
government reports, as well as our own conversations with regulators and industry
participants. As that part explains, we write at a crucial and unusual moment in the
regulatory history of consumer finance. Where the typical pattern for the last half
century – exemplified by regulation targeting credit card and subprime mortgage lending
– has been for federal preemption to expand ceaselessly to prevent effective state
regulation, 4 the last few years have witnessed an unparalleled determination by federal
regulators to withdraw from the field, leaving the way open for effective state regulation.
Responding to that opportunity, Part III, the heart of the Article, analyzes three
distinct policy perspectives that individual States might pursue, matched with regulatory
responses that implement those perspectives. Recognizing that a completely laissez faire
approach to the industry is not currently the policy in any jurisdiction in the United States
unlikely to be laid off or to have their payroll checks late or dishonored. So, it is not surprising
that check-cashing stores, and the payday lending stores that have grown out of them, often
appear near military bases. Moreover, the unstable location of military families makes them more
likely to rent and less likely to own homes than similarly-situated civilian families. Because the
credit reporting system disadvantages those who do not own homes, military families will have a
harder time gaining access to intermediate and long term credit products, making short-term
payday loans attractive.
4

For a lucid and comprehensive discussion, see Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing,
Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effects on Predatory Lending Regulation,
88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004).
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(or in any of our major trading partners in which the industry has made substantial
inroads), the three perspectives that we consider lie along a spectrum from total
prohibition, to a limited prohibition of indefinite rollover loans, to moderately-restrictive
licensing requirements.
We first consider whether payday lending should be tolerated at all. To the extent
that payday lending market is inevitably connected with consumer deception and
financial distress, we can make out a case for complete prohibition. For us, the strongest
counterargument is that prohibition of payday lending may only lead to a shift of lending
activity – borrowers will continue to borrow but will do so using products that are more
harmful than payday loans. But many empirical questions remain unanswered, especially
about the interaction among fringe credit products 5 and about the borrower side of this
market, 6 so it is difficult to evaluate payday lending’s societal effect.

5

For example, we know little about whether payday loans facilitate or substitute for other
borrowing. Although the U.K. has produced an interesting report explaining how the various
products work, where they are used, and what has happened when jurisdictions have tried to ban
particular products, it remains unclear how alternative borrowing products interact with each
other and which products are used by which sectors of the middle- and low-income population.
United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry, The Effect of Interest Rate Controls in Other
Countries (2004) [hereinafter DTI Report]. In other words, if we knew that borrowers frequently
used payday loans to pay the minimum balances on their credit cards or to recover pawned goods,
we might have different concerns than if we thought that those products did not interact.
6

There is little information about the most common uses of the borrowed funds, and, in
particular, whether there is reason to believe they encourage spending. The best study of which
we are aware is a study conducted by Environics Research Group on behalf of the Canadian
Association of Community Financial Service Providers. Based on a telephone survey of 1000
Canadian payday customers, the survey reports that 92% of payday customers ascribe their use of
the product to an immediate cash flow crisis and 4% to immediate consumption. Environics
Research Group, Understanding Consumers of Canada’s Payday Loans Industry 18 (June 9,
2005) [hereinafter Enivronics Study] (copy on file with authors). Also, studies have reached
differing conclusions about the demographics of payday borrowers. For example, industryfunded studies suggest that the customer base is relatively well off. See Environics Study, supra
note 6, at 5 (suggesting that payday loan users in Canada are about as likely to have incomes
above $60,000 as below $40,000); National Endowment for Financial Education, The Debt
Cycle: Using Payday Loans to Make Ends Meet 9 (undated summary of Feb. 2002 panel
discussion), available at www.nefe.org/pages/whitepaperpaydayloans.html [hereinafter NEFE

4

In any event, states that decide that an outright ban is best can eliminate this
product if they have the political will to do so. Drawing on the experience of New York,
we argue that the key is a hard and fast usury limit, coupled with vigilant enforcement
against efforts to import rates from other States. Because the federal banking regulators
have now limited the ability of banks to force states to permit the importation of out-ofstate interest rates, the States for the first time have a realistic option of excluding payday
lenders from their borders.
The second possibility is to ban indefinite “rollover” loans – transactions in which
payday customers borrow repetitively instead of repaying their loans. We develop the
reasons why indefinite rollover loans might – or might not – trouble thoughtful regulators
and discuss initiatives necessary to ban those loans effectively. Although many States
have adopted legislation purporting to curb rollovers, few, if any, States have legislation
that will be successful in that respect. Accordingly, we argue that legislatures should
combine a statewide database of all licensed lending transactions with a rule that bans not
only immediate rollover transactions but also requires a substantial cooling-off period
between transactions.
Finally, we offer a comprehensive set of proposals for jurisdictions that wish to
allow licensed lenders to operate within their borders but police abuses. Those proposals
proceed on two fronts. The first is a micro-front designed to make the product more
White Paper] (suggesting that customers typically have incomes between $25,000 and $50,000.
On the other hand, at least some independent studies present starker data. See id. at 9-10
(suggesting a median income of $24,000 in Chicago payday loan customers). The most that can
be said with certainty is that payday lending customers are sufficiently well off to have bank
accounts. Finally, despite path-breaking studies of consumer bankruptcy, there is little research
about the role of fringe products in the finances of the financially distressed. For some evidence
on that question, see Robert Mayer, One Payday, Many Payday Loans: Short-Term Lending
Abuse
in
Milwaukee
County
(undated
working
paper),
available
at
www.luc.edu/depts/polisci/research/mayer21.pdf.
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transparent so that customers can easily and reliably understand the charges they will pay
if they use this product. We would retain the licensing regimes that are common in most
jurisdictions, but would add two new initiatives.

First, we would ban the sales of

associated products, like insurance or membership fees that increase the cost of credit but
are not readily reflected in the price given to customers. Second, we would abandon the
misguided Truth In Lending Act disclosure regime in favor of a simpler, more
comprehensible and relevant disclosure of the dollar amount of the fee, stated as a
percentage of the loan amount and presented early in the transaction. 7
The second part of our approach is a macro-front, designed to increase
participation in the market by banks and other large national providers. The reputational
constraints and regulatory supervision of large companies make it easier to identify and
eradicate illegal and deceptive practices of those companies. The current environment is
one in which the perspective of regulators ranges from skepticism to hostility, in which
the largest and most responsible financial institutions are discouraged from participating
in these markets, leaving them to entities that are, by definition, less responsible. If local
governments want to permit payday lending, then it is important to ensure the
involvement of lenders with reputational interests at stake. It is much less clear that
banks have any special role in this market because the competencies that cause the large
national providers to excel are not necessarily attributes associated with depository
institutions. Moreover, the participation of banks in this market could frustrate the efforts
of States to implement reasonable regulatory schemes. Still, if banks in fact can compete
7

Many stores compete on the basis of this fee and advertise the information so that it is
available even before the borrower enters the store. However, to the extent the products involve
“hidden” fees, a disclosure requirement would force lenders to compete exclusively on price and
service.
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with the large national providers on an equal footing (that is, without a special ability to
avoid state regulatory authorities), then we think they should be encouraged to enter.
II. THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF PAYDAY LENDING
A. The Economics of Payday Lending
Payday lending is a significant industry in the United States, and it is growing. In
2003, payday lenders advanced somewhere between $25 billion 8 and $40 billion, 9 and
from 2000 to 2004, analysts estimate that the number of payday lending stores increased
from 10,000 to 22,000 10 – up from around just 200 at the start of the 1990s. 11 In the next
ten years, the number of stores is expected to double. 12 To understand how this growing
industry should be regulated, the first thing to understand is the product.
In financial terms, the product is a very short-term single-payment loan, in which
the lender extends a loan on one date, in return for a promise (usually evidenced by a
postdated check 13 or ACH 14 authorization) to repay the amount of the loan plus a
standard fee, usually in the range of $15 to $20 per $100 borrowed. 15 Notably, the

8

See id.

9

Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price?,
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2005-09, 21 (2005).
10

Id.

11

JOHN P. CASKEY, THE ECONOMICS OF PAYDAY LENDING 3 (2002).

12

First Cash Financial Services, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 10, 2005).

13

Advance America, Cash Advance Centers is an example of an operation that only
permits customers to obtain payday loans through personal checks. Advance America, Cash
Advance Centers, Inc, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 31, 2005).
14

“ACH” refers to the automated clearinghouse system, through which direct debits are
commonplace. For details, see RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS, Assignment 10 (3rd ed.
2006).
15

E.g., First Cash Financial Services, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Mar. 10,
2005) (“Fees charged for short-term advances are generally regulated by state law and range from
13.9% to 40% of the amount advances per transaction.”); QC Holdings, Inc., Annual Report
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amount of the fee is usually fixed, without regard to the number of days that will elapse
between the date of the loan and the fixed repayment date, which normally is the
expected date of the borrower’s next paycheck. 16
Historically, the payday loan developed from the business of check cashers, as a
variant in which the check casher advances a lower amount in return for its agreement to
defer presentment of the check. 17 One executive explained the source of the product as
follows:
We have been in the check-cashing business since 1983. Payday
loans grew out of that business in the early 1990’s. We would cash a
personal check on the weekend for 10% of the check, but most payroll
checks or government checks we would cash for 3%. So people would
come to us on Thursday and ask if we would cash it then and hold it until
Monday. For a while we said no we wouldn’t do that, then we started
trying it out, found there was a demand for cashing post-dated checks, and
slowly gravitated into that, charging an extra 5% or so for the extra risk
and service. People loved it. Their options, when they are in a bind, are
that they can write a check that will go on insufficient funds, but they’ll
get a charge of $35/check. So if they write three checks for a $100 they
will get $105 in fees, which is a pretty bad alternative. Or they can accept
the late-rent penalty. Or they can put off fixing their car and lose two or
three days of work.
To assess the creditworthiness of the borrower, the typical lender (at least if it is
one of the major chains discussed in the next section), will collect a few pieces of
information about the borrower, including proof of identification, evidence of income,

(Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 31, 2005) (“[A] fee . . . generally ranges between $15 to $20 per $100
borrowed.”). For a survey of different fees, see Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson,
Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military
Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 661 (2005).
16

Community Financial Services Association of America, What Is Payday Advance?, at
http://www.cfsa.net/mediares/bmediares.html. See also infra note 232 and accompanying text for
our discussion of the relation between this aspect of the rate structure and a sensible disclosure
scheme.
17

See Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of
Colorado’s Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U.L. REV. 387, 393 (2005).
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and a current bank statement. 18 The store will evaluate those criteria using a software
program, functionally parallel to the credit scoring that credit card issuers use to evaluate
their customers. 19 In some cases, though certainly not all, the data might be checked
against a database with information about prior behavior available from a company like
TeleTrack. 20 If the loan is approved,21 the funds are advanced immediately. 22 If the loan
goes into default, it is difficult to generalize about collection processes, which plainly
vary.

For the large providers, however, collection efforts typically stop short of

18

For a general description, see Charles Gerena, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
Need
Quick
Cash?,
REGION
FOCUS,
Summer
2002,
available
at,
http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic_research/region_focus/summer_2002/feature
3.cfm. For specific lenders describing their own requirements, see Advance America, Cash
Advance Centers, Inc, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 31, 2005) (noting that customers
must have usually have “proof of identification, a pay stub or other evidence of income, and a
bank statement); First Cash Financial Services, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Mar. 10,
2005) (“To qualify for a short-term advance, customers generally must have proof of steady
income, a checking account with a minimum of returned items within a specified period, and
valid identification.”); QC Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Mar. 31, 2005) (“To
obtain a payday loan from us, a customer must complete a loan application, maintain a personal
checking account, have a source of income and not otherwise be in default on a loan from us.”).
19

E.g., First Cash Financial Services, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Mar. 10,
2005) (“Computer operating systems in the Company’s payday advance stores allow a store
manager or clerk to recall rapidly customer check cashing histories, short-term advance histories,
and other vital information.”); Ace Cash Express, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 9 (Sept. 7,
2005) (“For the short-term consumer loans we offer, the customer’s application data is
electronically transmitted to our centralized computer system, which scores the loan with a
proprietary loan-scoring system. An approval or denial is communicated back to the store, where
the required loan documentation or adverse action form is printed for the customer.”).
20

The industry sources to whom we have spoken suggest that they do not use sources like
TeleTrack regularly because its data is so spotty that it is not often useful. One explained that it
only lowers the rate of default by about 25%.
21

We have not found any public information about denial rates.

22

Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, Inc, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar.
31, 2005) (“Immediately upon completion of the approval process, the customer is given cash or
a check . . . .”); SHEILA BAIR, LOW-COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES
(2005).
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litigation, largely because of the small amounts at stake and the limited likelihood of
enforcing a judgment against a defaulting payday loan customer. 23
The industry depends heavily on retail store locations, generally because of the
sense that many customers will travel only to the store that is nearest their place of
employment. As described in the FDIC study by Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk,
the typical store is surprisingly small, with an outstanding loan portfolio of less than
$100,000 and annual revenues of about $350,000. As stores age, their profitability
increases substantially – a typical new store will make less than 1000 loans a year, while
a mature store will make more than 8500 loans a year. 24 Because so many of a store’s
costs are fixed, the costs per loan from the mature stores are much lower than the costs
per loan from the newer stores. 25
An important part of the business model is its dependency on repeat customers. 26
Flannery & Samolyk report that about 46% of all loans are either renewals of existing
loans or new loans that follow immediately upon the payment of an exiting loan
23

Sources in the industry advise us that defaulted payday loan debt sells for about three
cents on the dollar, considerably less than the ten-twelve cents on the dollar for which first-run
defaulted credit-card debt sells.
24

Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 9. In the FDIC study, a mature store was one
more than four years old.
25

See Ernst & Young, The Cost of Providing Payday Loans in Canada 39-43 (2004)
[hereinafter E&Y Canada Study]. Chris Robinson at York University has made this same point:
large operations have lower costs than small operations, allowing larger lenders to make a profit
with stricter rate caps. Chris Robinson, Regulation of Payday Lending in Canada: A Report to
ACORN
(May
24,
2006),
available
at
http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Centers/Press/Report/Payday_Lending_Canada.pdf#search=%22
acorn%20study%20payday%20lenders%20canada%22; see James Daw, Payday Loans Rules in
the Offing, TORONTO STAR, May 30, 2006 (discussing the Robinson ACORN Report).
26

The dependency makes sense. We know from annual reports that rollover loans are
faster and easier for customers than obtaining the initial loan and that they are less expensive for
lenders to process. QC Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Mar. 31, 2005) (“Once
the initial application and loan process is completed, future transactions can be processed in only
a few minutes.”).
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(“rollovers”). Interestingly, customers at more mature stores are likely to have more
rollover loans. For example, while 17% of customers limit themselves to one loan per
year at young stores, only 13% so limit themselves at mature stores. At the other end of
the portfolio, 24% of customers at young stores borrow more than 12 times per year,
while 30% of the customers at mature stores borrow more than 12 times per year. 27
Flannery & Samolyk do qualify this conclusion, however, by noting that “we find no
evidence that loan rollovers and repeat borrowers affect store profits beyond their
proportional contribution to total loan volume. 28
It is possible that the Flannery & Samolyk study understates this phenomenon.
For example, a study by the Center for Responsible Lending, using data from North
Carolina regulators, reports that 91% of loans are made to borrowers with five or more
loans per year. 29 Similarly, Chessin’s analysis of Colorado data suggests that about 65%
of loan volume in that State comes from customers that borrow more than 12 times a
year. Chessin notes a particular pattern – “borrowing from Peter to pay Paul” – in which
customers avoid renewal limits by alternating between lenders, using the funds from each
lender in turn to pay off the other. 30
Although loss rates are lower than the riskiness of the customer base might
suggest, losses still consume a substantial portion of industry revenues. In Flannery &
Samolyk’s sample, for example, losses and collection expenses amounted to $6 per loan

27

Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 12-13.

28

Id. at 2.

29

Keith Ernst et al., Quantifying the Economic Cost of Predatory Payday Lending (Feb.
2004), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf.
30

Chessin, supra note 17, at 398.
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at mature stores and $9 per loan at young stores. 31 When added to local operating
expenses, but excluding any allocation for overhead for the chain, this produces a total
cost-per-$100 of $14 for young stores and $11 for mature stores, an amount sufficiently
below the typical fee of $15 per hundred to leave an opportunity for profitable
operation. 32 The multivariate analysis that Flannery & Samolyk provide suggests one
other key point of interest – that the costs of serving high-frequency borrowers are much
less than the costs of serving low-frequency borrowers. This is true, they emphasize,
both because the loss ratios are significantly lower for high-frequency borrowers and
because the operating costs are lower. 33 As sources in the industry explain to us, a loan
to a first-time borrower is likely to require verification of the validity of a telephone
number and a bank account, as well as some investigation of the identity of the borrower.
Those steps – which are costly in the context of a loan with a fee of only $30 – can be
omitted for repeat customers.
B. The Competitive Structure of the Payday Lending Industry
Because the competitive landscape is important to designing a sensible set of
policy recommendations, it is useful to sketch the basic structure of the payday lending
industry. For present purposes, four sets of players are important: “mom and pop”
providers; large national providers; banks; and internet providers. In a way, we might
regard these players as the past, the present, and the potential future of payday lending.

31

This is consistent with the loss rates that Chessin reports. See Chessin, supra note 17,
at 408 (reporting loss rates of about 3.3%).
32

Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 10.

33

Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 16-17.
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1. “Mom and Pop” Providers
First, there is a very large and vaguely defined set of local providers, what we
might euphemistically call “mom and pop” providers. Because these entities are not
publicly traded, and because they often are not licensed even in jurisdictions that require
a license to engage in the business of consumer lending, it is hard to generalize about
them. A few observations, however, are useful. For one thing, it is clear that the rapid
growth of the industry in the last decade has come not from this group of small shops, but
rather from the entry of the larger national providers. Second, the fact that much of the
growth of the larger providers has come from acquisitions of mom and pop providers 34
suggests that the larger providers are crowding out these providers – just as surely as
Borders and Barnes & Noble join with Amazon.com to crowd out local independent
booksellers. Still, the majority of stores in the industry are small shops, because the large
national providers do not yet have 5,000 locations.
The most important question about these mom and pop providers is how they
have managed to make money in this industry without the benefit of the payday lending
statutes (discussed below) that exempt banks from usury limits in the range of 20-30%.
We see two possibilities. One is that these providers are more efficient in their business
practices than the large national providers (which clearly cannot operate profitably by

34

As we explain above, mature stores are more likely to have a customer base of repeat
borrowers and are likely to be more profitable than new stores. Moreover, to the extent that the
mom and pop providers have chosen the best locations, the larger providers will be at a
disadvantage if they try to compete by opening new stores. Thus, many of the larger providers
find it more profitable to grow by acquisition than by development of new locations. E.g., First
Cash Financial Services, Inc, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 10, 2005) (“Because of the
highly fragmented nature of both the pawn industry and the payday industry and the payday
advance industry, as well as the availability of certain regional chains and ‘mom & pop’ sole
proprietors willing to sell their stores, the Company believes that certain acquisition opportunities
may arise from time to time.”).
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making loans at such a low rate). 35 The other is that the small size of these providers
allows them to operate “under the radar” – in more or less chronic violation of applicable
laws governing usury and debt collection. We have no hard evidence on this point, but
the best evidence points toward the latter hypothesis – especially the high fixed costs that
tend to make larger lenders more efficient than smaller lenders. 36
2. Large National Providers
The second group is the large national providers, a set of aggressively growing
publicly traded companies that are moving rapidly into as many jurisdictions as possible
with as many locations as possible.

These businesses operate on a “McDonald’s”

philosophy – with a specific business model to be replicated in as many retail outlets
nationwide as they can identify suitable locations. 37
Although their annual reports trumpet their unique characteristics, to the outsider
the general outlook is like the competition between McDonalds, Burger King, and
Wendy’s, all trying to pursue very similar business models, hoping to get the best
locations for their chain as rapidly as possible. A brief description of the five largest
35

The Flannery & Samolyk study suggests a rate (excluding overhead and central
operating expenses) of about $14/$100. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 10. Our
interviews with industry professionals suggest that is probably a bit high, especially for multiline
stores (that have more products against which to offset the fixed costs of a branch). But they all
agree that the lowest possible cost estimate under current circumstances is greater than $10/$100.
Interestingly, in the view of our industry sources, the cost of credit losses (estimated at about
$3/$100) far exceeded the cost of funds (less than $1/$100).
36

Consider, for example, the “loan shark predator” discussed in Duwayne Escobedo,
Loan Shark Predator: Tale of Alabama Man’s Payday Lending Schemes, Independent News, July
20, 2006, available at http://www.inweekly.net/article.asp?artID=3233 (last visited July 29, 2006)
(discussing felony criminal charges against John Gill, a wealthy Alabama resident being pursued
by consumer finance regulators for illegal lending activities in Alabama, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington).
37

E.g., Cash America International, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 10,

2005).
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players is adequate to illustrate the point. The largest pure payday lender in the country
is Advance America, with 2400 stores in 34 states. 38 Dollar Financial Corp. is the second
largest, with about 1300 stores, but it is much more of an international player than
Advance America (with 350 of its stores in Canada and 450 in the UK). 39 The two other
most important players leverage their dominance in other consumer finance products into
a major presence in this market. Thus, Ace Cash Express is a major payday lender based
on its status as the largest owner and operator of check cashing stores, with 1371 stores in
37 states. 40 Similarly, Cash America, the leading pawn lender in the country, makes
payday loans from about 700 locations, mostly in its pawn shops.

41

Finally, QC

Holdings has a 370-store chain built on its claim to have been one of the inventors of the
modern payday loan product in the early 1990’s. 42
3. Banks
The next players in the industry are banks. At first glance, it should seem odd that
banks – whose credit card lending practices suggest plenty of appetite for risky consumer
lending – do not play a major role in this market. But as we write, there are no banks that
play a direct role of consequence in the payday lending market.43 To be sure, as we

38

Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1
(Mar. 31, 2005).
39

Dollar Financial Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Aug. 31, 2005).

40

Ace Cash Express, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Sept. 7, 2005).

41

First Cash Financial Services, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 10, 2005).

42

QC Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 31, 2005).

43

Wells Fargo Bank does offer a payday lending product, Direct Deposit Advance. See
https://www.wellsfargo.com/wf/checking/dda/terms. We discuss this product infra note 242.
One difficulty is cultural. Subprime borrowers might not want to use banking services even if
banks offered payday loans. Commentators from the United States, Canada, and Australia all
have noted this problem. See NEFE White Paper, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing the distaste
payday customers have for the “mahogany and brass” atmosphere of U.S. banks); Iain Ramsay
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discuss below, from about 2000-2005 banks facilitated the growth of the national payday
lending providers by partnering with them, so that the providers could avoid local usury
restrictions through the shelter of federal rules preempting the application of those
restrictions to the banks. As we discuss below, that practice is largely if not entirely a
thing of the past. 44
It also is true that most of the large national payday lenders are funded by some of
the largest banks. For example, press reports suggest that Wells Fargo provides funding
for Advance America and Cash America, that JPMorgan Chase provides funds for Cash
America and for ACE Cash Express, and that Bank of America and Wachovia provide a
syndicated credit line to Advance America. On the equity side, Fidelity Funds is the
largest single stockholder in ACE Cash Express, and JPMorgan and Bank of America
both own more than 1% of Cash America. 45 But despite those investments, the role of
banks in the current market is indirect and marginal. We discuss in the closing section of
Part III some reasons why we think this is unfortunate.
4. Internet Providers
The hardest sector of the industry to understand is the internet-only providers. It
is

clear

that

they

exist;

indeed

they

have

their

own

search

aggregator

(paydayloanoffers.com), which provides advice on the best available payday loan terms

(for Office of Consumer Affairs, Industry Canada and Ministry of the Attorney General, British
Columbia), Access to Credit in the Alternative Consumer Credit Market 36 (2000) (suggesting
that Canadians with low incomes are distrustful of banks because banks are intimidating and treat
lower-income customers poorly); Dean Wilson (Consumer Law Centre Victoria Ltd), Payday
Lending in Victoria—A Research Report 80 (2002) (attributing the preference of Australian
consumers for payday lenders to the perception that banks provide bad service to consumers).
44

See infra notes 66 – 74 and accompanying text.

45

JPMorgan, Banks Back Lenders Luring Poor with 780 Percent Rates, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Nov. 23, 2004.
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on any given day. You need only Google “payday loans” and you will see a large group
of sponsored and natural links to online providers. To get a sense for the most successful
providers, we looked at the Web sites for the sponsored links for searches on “payday
loans” at Google, Yahoo!, and MSN. 46

This produced a total of eight sites:

mycashnow.com

MSN),

(Google,

Yahoo!,

and

tendollarpaydayloan.com

and

paydayselect.com (Google and Yahoo!), nationalfastcash.com and 1000-easy-paydayloan.com (Yahoo! only), paydayok.com (Google only), and cashadvancenetwork.com
and instantcashloantillpayday.com (MSN only). Several things are interesting about
those search results, starting with the fact that the dominant rate in the online market
appears to be about $10/$100, significantly lower than the $15/$100 rate that seems to be
the benchmark rate for the retail locations of the large national providers, 47 and
considerably lower than the typical rate identified in a major 2004 survey by the
Consumer Federation of America (“CFA”). 48 Another thing is that the internet providers
are all Internet “fronts.” By that, we mean that you can tell very little about them from
the Web sites. A careful reading of the Web site will not tell you whether a bank is
involved, in most cases will not give you a brick-and-mortar location for the lender, 49 and
does not suggest the involvement of any of the large national providers. The only thing it
46

These searches produce different results, even on the same day. We report here a set of
companies found based on repeated searches on May 14 and 15, 2006.
47

The rates at the sponsored sites ranged from $10/$100 (tendollarpaydayloans.com,
paydayok.com, and 1000-easy-payday-loan.com), to $15/$100 (paydayselect.com), $18/$100
(mycashnow.com), $30/$100 (cashadvancenetwork.com and instantcashloantillpayday.com), and
unspecified (nationalcashfast.com).
48

Consumer Federation of America, How High-Priced Lenders Use the Internet to Mire
Borrowers in Debt and Evade State Consumer Protections (Nov. 30, 2004) [hereinafter CFA
Survey], available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Internet_Payday_Lending113004.PDF.
49

Of the eight, only paydayselect.com and paydayok.com offer any address, both
offering (different) post office boxes in Ruidoso, New Mexico. The CFA Survey suggests that
this is not a new problem. See CFA Survey, supra note 48.

17

tells you of significance about the lawfulness of the transactions is an assertion that the
transactions are governed by the law of the lender’s location. 50
Several possibilities about those lenders suggest themselves, all of which are
speculative in the absence of hard information that we have been unable to obtain. One
possibility is that the only way those lenders can profit at the low rates is by cheating in
one way or another. There certainly is considerable evidence to support that perspective.
For example, the CFA Survey suggests that the overwhelming majority of these lenders
operate in violation of the law of the location of their customers. 51 It also suggests that
many of them violate federal law by forcing borrowers to grant electronic access to their
bank accounts. 52 There are other possibilities, of course. One regulator who had dealt
with some of those providers suggests that they can profit at rates lower than the national
providers because they avoid the costs of retail branch locations. 53

This raises the

possibility that the market for payday loans is segmented, between the relatively lowincome customers that seek out lenders based solely on retail proximity to their employer

50

Of the eight, five do not identify what that law is, mycashnow.com selects the law of
Grenada, and paydayselect.com and paydayok.com select the law of New Mexico. It is unlikely
choice-of-law clauses are enforceable because most states’ long-arm statutes permit states to
enforce their own laws for loans to citizens within the state. For a detailed account of this
jurisdictional issue, see Frank Burt et al., Journey to the Fringe: A Survey of Select Fringe
Lending Products, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI ORDER
NO. 85651532 PLI/CORP 349, Mar.-May 2006, at 381-82.
51

See generally CFA Survey, supra note 48.

52

See generally CFA Survey, supra note 48 (discussing § 913 of the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693k).
53

Interview with Sealy Hutchings, General Counsel, Texas Office of the Consumer
Credit Commissioner, Austin Texas (Feb. 28, 2006).
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and the relatively better-off customers that use broadband Internet access and Google
searches to find their payday lender of choice. 54
This is not to say that there is no fraud in the Internet payday lending industry.
On the contrary, fraudulent lending practices are common in that sector. 55 For example,
both New York 56 and Pennsylvania 57 have had recent notable enforcement actions
against fraudulent Internet providers. It is not clear to us, however, that those kinds of
providers are the providers purchasing sponsored advertisements on Google. Rather,
they seem to us a sort of Internet underworld much like the brick-and-mortar underworld
that populates some share of the mom-and-pop providers. Recent activity in the industry
– most notably the acquisition by Cash America (a large national operation) of a major
licensed Internet lender (CashNetUSA) 58 – might presage consolidation in this sector
similar to the consolidation that has been occurring in the brick-and-mortar sector.

54

One site specializing in payday loan in Houston illustrates how the Internet may
enhance competition among lenders generally. Cash Advance Houston Loan promises to display
five lending options for people seeking a payday loan in Houston. See http://www.cash-advanceloan-houston.com.
55

Payday Lenders Use Internet to Avoid Law, Biz Report (Nov. 30, 2004), at
www.bizreport.com/news/8482/.
56

See Internet Concerns Top Consumer Complaints (Feb. 8, 2006 press release) ,
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/feb/feb08a_06.html (discussing enforcement
action against New York Catalog Sales).
57

See Commonwealth Shuts Down Alleged Illegal Web-Based “Payday Lending”
Scheme
(Sept.
28,
2005
press
release),
available
at
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/press.aspx?id=670 (discussing enforcement action against Ace
Pays).
58

See Erick Bergquist, Cash America Buying Online Lender Licensed in 27 States,
AMERICAN BANKER, July 11, 2006. Consistent with this discussion, Cash America’s CEO
commented that CashNetUSA “is one of the few companies that we have found operating in this
space that has gone through the very rigorous process of getting licensed state by state and
organizing their technology to deliver documents in accordance with state laws.”
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C. The Regulatory Structure of the Payday Lending Industry
1. Federal Regulations
The recent enactment of the Talent-Nelson amendment 59 – which imposes a 36%
cap on many loans to military personnel and their dependents – has given prominence to
the possibility that federal law someday might limit the operations of payday lenders
more broadly. 60 For now, however, the role of federal law is limited to two incremental
functions. Although there is no federal licensing regime for payday lenders, and certainly
no federal rate ceiling, the Consumer Credit Protection Act affects the operations of
payday lenders in important ways. Most importantly, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
requires conspicuous disclosure of finance charges and interest rates, communicated in
dollar amounts and percentages. 61 If, as we argue below, TILA plays an important role
in confusing consumers in this market, it is a significant, albeit perverse, part of the
regulatory regime.
What is more interesting is federal displacement of state regulation. So, for
example, Section 85 of the National Bank Act permits any national bank to charge an
interest rate as high as the maximum rate permitted by the laws of the state where the
59

John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Pub. L. No.
109-???, § 670 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 987).
60

In our view, the case for regulating borrowing by military personnel is weak. If there is
a link between financial distress and payday lending, it affects both civilian and military
populations. See Morgan Stanley, Advance America 25 (Jan. 25, 2005 equity research report)
(table showing inverse correlation between average income level in each state and the number of
stores per household). And, military personnel are not likely to be more susceptible to cognitive
biases than the immigrants and other low-income civilians who routinely use these products.
61

15 U.S.C. § 1601; 12 C.F.R. Part 226.4. Courts and regulators have clarified that TILA
governs payday loans. See Regulation Z Staff Commentary to 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14)
(concluding that payday loans are covered by the Regulation Z disclosure rules); Turner v. E-Z
Check Cashing of Cookeville, TN, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (M.D. Tenn. 1999) (“Courts
that have addressed the issue have held, without exception, that deferred presentment transactions
are extensions of ‘credit’ under TILA.”).
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bank is “located.” 62 Since the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Marquette National
Bank v. First Omaha Service Corporation, 63 it has been clear that a bank is located for
purposes of that provision only in the state of the bank’s headquarters. Thus, a national
bank located in a state with a high usury limit (like South Dakota or Delaware) can
“import” that rate into any other State in which it does business. 64
What is less well-known – but of importance here – is that federal law also gives
state-chartered banks a parallel right to import rates, under Section 27 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured
depository institutions, . . . [any FDIC-insured] bank . . . may,
notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby
preempted for the purposes of this section, . . . charge on any loan . . .
interest . . . at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank
is located. 65
As it happens, banks in this country for various historical reasons have had little
interest in participating directly in the payday lending market. During the early years of
this decade, however, many banks partnered with large national providers so that those
providers could use the federal preemptive shelter available to the banks to operate
programs that otherwise would have violated state usury laws.66 This activity – generally

62

12 U.S.C. § 85.

63

439 U.S. 299.

64

See Schiltz, supra note 4.

65

12 U.S.C. 1831d(a); see Schiltz, supra note 4, at 565-69 (discussing the 1980 adoption
of that provision); Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying that
provision to bank involved in payday lending), vacated as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (2006).
66

Chad A. Cicconi, A Role for Payday Lenders, 123 BANKING L.J. 235, 239-40 (2006).
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decried as “rent-a-charter” programs 67 – ultimately came under scrutiny by federal
regulators.
One by one, those regulators barred banks under their supervision from
participating in payday lending programs operated by third parties.

For nationally

chartered banks, the Comptroller of the Currency took action in 2000 and 2001 to prevent
national banks teaming up with state banks. 68 The Federal Reserve (for state banks that
are members of the Federal Reserve) did not take formal action to stop the activity.69 But
concerns of regulators about the transparency of operations did cause one large
“partnering” bank to leave the Federal Reserve system to avoid the scrutiny of federal
regulators. 70
But as long as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had not acted, state
banks remained relatively free to engage in this activity. Thus, the County Bank of

67

E.g., Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Regulations, 2004 U. ILL.
L. REV. 723, 732 (2004).
68

OCC Advisory Letter 2000-9, August 29, 2000; OCC Advisory Letter 2000-10,
November 27, 2000; Third-Party Relationships, OCC Bulletin, OCC 2001-47 (Nov. 1, 2001).
69

Indeed, both Greenspan and Bernanke have taken quite benevolent views of the
industry. See Letter from Alan Greenspan to Rep. Melvin L. Watt (January 2, 2001) [copy on file
with author] (recounting the preference “that markets and competition – enhanced by appropriate
disclosures – regulate loan terms and conditions”); Letter from Alan Greenspan to Rep. Pat Tiberi
(Aug. 16, 2004) [copy on file with author] (reiterating the view that no action is necessary with
regard to payday lending); Remarks by Chairman S. Bernanke at the 5th Regional Issues
Conference of the 15th Cong. Dist. of Texas, Washington D.C. (June 13, 2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2006/20060613/default.htm (praising the
spread of payday lenders as a source of alternative financial services for lower-income families).
70

First Bank of Delaware relinquished its Federal Reserve membership in 2003 and thus
became subject to regulation by the FDIC. See Letter from Jean Ann Fox, President, Consumer
Federation of America to Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC (Oct. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/fdicletter10-2003.pdf. To get a sense for the concerns of the
applicable regulator (the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia), see the skeptical comments
about the safety and soundness of payday lending in Robert W. Snarr, Jr., No Cash ‘til Payday:
The Payday Lending Industry, Compliance Corner (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia), 1st
Qu. 2002, at CC1.
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Rehoboth

Beach,

participation. 71

Delaware

gained

considerable

notoriety

for

its

continued

In July 2005, however, the FDIC issued its Guidelines on Payday

Lending. 72 Although those regulations do not directly prohibit partnering with thirdparty payday lenders, they do impose onerous capital requirements and require
institutions to “[l]imit the number and frequency of extensions, deferrals, [and]
renewals.” 73

In practice, they have made it impractical for state-chartered banks to

continue partnering with the major national providers. Accordingly, by early 2006,
charter-renting had come to an end. 74
2. State Regulations
As federal regulators remove the protective umbrella of federal law, we enter an
era in which States will be free to make their own choices about payday lending. As far

71

For instance, Dollar Financial used the County Bank of Rehoboth Beach. Dollar
Financial Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 11 (Aug. 31, 2005).
72

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Guidelines for Payday Lenders (July 1, 2005),
available at www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/payday.
73

Id.

74

The clearest signal is the decision of the en banc 11th Circuit in April 2006 to dismiss
as moot a major case involving a challenge by the principal state charter-renting banks to a
Georgia law designed to exclude the partners of those banks from operating in Georgia.
Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 2006). The annual reports from large
payday lenders filed in the second half of 2005 confirm that payday lenders got the message.
Dollar Financial Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 11 (Aug. 31, 2005) (“The Payday
Lending Guidance, among other things, limits the period a borrower may have payday loans
outstanding from any FDIC-insured bank to three months during a twelve-month period. As a
result of the Payday Lending Guidance, we are transitioning from the bank-funded consumer loan
model to the company-funded consumer loan model in most of the states where we previously
offered bank-funded consumer loans. As part of this transition, we terminated our relationship
with County Bank and amended our relationship with First Bank, in each case by mutual
agreement.”); Ace Cash Express, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 9 (Sept. 7, 2005) (“The
revised FDIC guidelines became effective on July 1, 2005, and affect the loans offered at our
stores by Republic Bank. In fiscal 2006, we have introduced two new loan products to our Texas
customers and one new loan product to our customers in Arkansas and Pennsylvania that provide
alternatives to the loan product offered by Republic Bank. These new loan products will provide
consumers who exceed the maximum allowable payday loans under the revised FDIC guidelines
access to the credit they require.”).
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as we can tell, all States that tolerate payday lending have some scheme of licensing or
regulation. The real question, however, is whether the States will tolerate payday lending
at all. On that question, current state law varies greatly.75 In an effort to provide an
orderly description of the landscape as it exists today – a snapshot at the end of the renta-charter era – we identify three distinct regulatory regimes: explicit toleration; formal,
but under-enforced prohibition; and true prohibition. We recognize the difficulties of
understanding the actual regulatory practices in any particular State.

But there is

considerable illustrative value in summarizing some representative examples. For these
purposes, we have chosen Michigan as an example of explicit toleration, Texas as an
example of formal but under-enforced prohibition, and New York as an example of true
prohibition.
(a) Explicit Toleration
State law related to payday lending varies greatly, but the most common situation
is a statute that explicitly authorizes the practice. The Community Financial Services
Association (CFSA), a trade group representing the major payday lenders, has supported
a model bill in numerous state legislatures in recent years 76 and has had noted success in
obtaining adoption: the CFSA Web site claims adoption in 25 states. The model bill
contains several notable features: loans can only be made for $500 or less, loans can only
75

For detailed breakdowns of the different state laws governing payday lending, see
Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at Table 1; Moss, supra note 2, at 1740. The most
comprehensive and accessible information is at CFA, Payday Loan Consumer Information,
available at http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/states.cfm.
76

The CFSA supports the Deferred Deposit Loan Act adopted by the Committee on
Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments. E-mail from Kara J. Marshall,
Esq., Staff Attorney, Community Financial Services Association, to Jim Hawkins (May 25, 2006
16:37:43 CST) (on file with authors).
That legislation is available at
http://www.csg.org/programs/ssl/documents/2002.pdf [hereinafter Model Deferred Deposit Act].
For a discussion of the lobbying and the model bill, see Chessin, supra note 17, at 398.
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be renewed 3 times, borrowers can rescind a loan within a day, lenders must obtain
licenses to operate, lenders cannot use threats of criminal prosecution for check fraud,
and most striking, fees are capped at 20% of the first three hundred dollars lent and 7.5%
of any funds lent over three hundred dollars. 77
Michigan’s 2005 adoption of the euphemistically named “Deferred Presentment
Service Transactions Act” is a good example of a statute that draws from the CFSA’s
model act and tolerates payday lending. 78 This is a detailed statute, with 33 sections
divided into four articles. Setting aside the first article (which offers a title and a series of
definitions), 79 the remaining articles deal with licensing, 80 regulation of the transaction, 81
and remedies. 82 The licensing article requires a license for any company engaged in the
business of “deferred presentment service transactions” except for a federally insured
bank. 83 The statute defines “deferred presentment service transaction” to include any
transaction in which the licensee agrees to pay the customer a sum of money, in exchange
for a fee, and then to “[h]old a customer’s check for a period of time before negotiation,
redemption, or presentment of the chec[k].” 84 To obtain a license, the licensee must
show a net worth of $50,000 per location, up to a maximum of $250,000, as well as “the
financial responsibility, financial condition, business experience, character, and general

77

Model Deferred Deposit Act, supra note 76, at §§ 5, 6, 8, 16, 20.

78

P.A. 2005, No. 244 (codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 487.2121 - .2173).

79

Mich. C.L.A. §§ 487.2121-.2122. For other similar examples, see Cal. Fin. Code §§
23000 – 23106; 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 122/1-1.
80

Mich. C.L.A. §§ 487.2131-2142.

81

Mich. C.L.A. §§ 487.2151-2160.

82

Mich. C.L.A. §§ 487.2165-2173.

83

Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2131.

84

Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2122(1)(g).
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fitness to reasonably warrant a belief that the applicant will conduct its business lawfully
and fairly.” 85 Each licensee also is obligated to post a $50,000 surety bond. 86
Of greatest interest, the licensing article includes a provision – not in the CFSA’s
model act – which requires the commissioner to develop a statewide database “that has
real-time access through an internet connection [and] is accessible at all times to
licensees,” which will, among other things, allow any licensee to “[v]erify whether a
customer has any open deferred presentment service transactions with any licensee.” 87
As you would expect, the substantive article that regulates transactions focuses
primarily on disclosure.

Thus, licensees must post large signs (in 36-point type)

emphasizing to customers several of the constraints the Act imposes – “[W]e must * * *
give you a copy of your signed agreement.” “State law prohibits us from using any
criminal process to collect on an agreement.” “State law entitles you to information
regarding filing a complaint against us if you believe that we have violated the law.” It
also includes precatory advice, such as that “[y]ou should use this service only to meet
short-term cash needs.” 88 The same notices must be included in a written agreement that
the customer signs. 89
There are, however, some substantive restrictions.

First, the maximum

transaction is capped at $600, 90 and a licensee cannot extend funds if a search of the state
database indicates that the borrower has more than one transaction open with another
85

Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2132.

86

Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2134.

87

Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2142.

88

Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2151.

89

Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2152.

90

Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2153(1).
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licensee. 91

This provision is important, given empirical evidence suggesting that

borrowers often obtain payday loans from multiple providers. 92 Second, although the
statute is not clearly written, it appears to cap the maximum fee at a declining amount,
starting at $15 for the first $100, and declining to $11 for the sixth $100. 93 Third, the
licensee cannot tie the purchase of any other financial service to the deferred presentment
service transaction. 94 The licensee can require arbitration in its contracts only if the
licensee agrees to bear all of the costs and if the arbitration occurs no more than ten miles
from the borrower’s address as shown in the agreement. 95 Finally, the statute prohibits
criminal penalties for failure to pay checks given in deferred presentment service
transactions. 96
Equally significant is what the statute does not regulate. First, notice that these
provisions do not impose a limit on rollover transactions. On that point the statute grants
the customer an option that seems to us unlikely to have a substantial impact: a customer
that enters into eight transactions in any 12-month period must be granted the option to
repay the outstanding debt in three installments, with one installment due on each
91

Mich. C.L.A. §§ 487.2153(2); 487.2154.
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See Mayer, supra note 6; Chessin, supra note 17, at 411-12 (suggesting that this is
common in Colorado).
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Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2153(1)(a). The statute states that a licensee can charge a service
fee. It then states that the licensee “may charge both of the following as part of the service fee.”
One of the items that follow is a database verification fee, if approved by the commissioner (not
yet in place). The other is the sliding-scale fee discussed in the text. The statute as written seems
to permit the possibility that the lender could charge some other fee as part of the “service fee.”
Governor Granholm’s press release praising the bill when she signed it, however, explicitly
adopts the interpretation discussed in the text. Governor Granholm’s Consumer Protections
Against Payday Lenders Wins Legislative Approval (Nov. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/gov/0,1607,7-168-23442-129955--,00.html
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Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2160.
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Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2152(3).
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Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2158(4).
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subsequent payday. 97 Second, the statute grants a direct exemption from usury laws,
providing explicitly that the service fee that the statute authorizes “is not interest.” 98
Because the normal usury limit in Michigan is 10%, 99 some exemption obviously is
necessary for this type of business to operate. 100
The final article, related to remedies, includes straightforward provisions
permitting customers to file complaints with the state commissioner of the office of
financial services, 101 and permits the commissioner to investigate those complaints, issue
cease and desist orders, suspend or revoke licenses, and impose fines. 102 Finally, the
statute creates a private cause of action for any “person injured by a licensee’s violation”
of the act, including a right to reasonable attorney’s fees. 103
(b) Under-enforced Prohibition
The second common pattern in recent years is a formal prohibition of payday
lending, coupled with a lack of resources or effort adequate to make the prohibition
effective. 104 The prohibition normally takes the form of a usury limit that has no specific
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Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2155.
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Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2153(1).
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Mich. C.L.A. § 438.101.
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Lest that rate seem unrealistic, you should recall that federal law preempts the state
rule with respect to many important lending transactions, including home mortgages and loans
issued by federally insured banks, see MANN, supra note 14 (Assignment 20); James J. White,
The Usury Trompe L’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445 (2000).
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Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2165.
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Mich. C.L.A. §§ 487.2165-2168.
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Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2173.
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There are obvious public-choice explanations for underenforcement. The lenders
might have sufficient influence on policymakers in the States to ensure that regulators will not
actually exclude them. A second possibility is resource limitations. Many jurisdictions, for
example, may not be accustomed to devoting the level of resources to financial regulatory
enforcement that is typical of New York in the era of Eliot Spitzer. Finally, efforts to enforce
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exception authorizing payday lending transactions. The ineffectiveness of usury limits is
apparent from participation in the market not only by small “under-the-radar” local
providers, but also large national providers, which typically have operated under the
shelter of an out-of-state bank. Here, Texas provides a good example. 105
Like many states, Texas has a complex set of usury ceilings with different levels
applicable to different kinds of loans. In general, however, the highest permissible
ceiling for loans below $250,000 is capped at 24%. 106

Texas has for many years,

anti-payday loan legislation would have been difficult during the charter-renting era that is only
now coming to a close.
105

Although we do not discuss it in detail here, Canada provides an even starker example.
Formally, Canada’s federal usury limit of 60%, Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 §
347(2), would make payday lending illegal. Yet, the evidence suggests, it has been flourishing in
recent years unfettered by prosecution. The Toronto Star reported that as of 2005, there had been
no prosecutions against payday lenders. Jim Rankin & Nicole MacIntyre, Loans Firm Curbed,
TORONTO STAR, August 31, 2005, at A-1. The highly visible growth, however, has produced a
backlash in the last year or so, reflected in a growing number of highly visible actions challenging
what in some cases might be flagrantly illegal activity. E.g., Kilroy v. A OK Payday Loans Inc.,
2006 BCSC 1213 (holding in a class action that the rates charged by payday lenders exceeded the
criminal statutory limit); Carol Goar, Payday Loan Industry in Court, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 1,
2006; Jim Rankin, Suit Against Payday Lender Gets a Boost, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 6, 2006;
Class Action Certified in Payday Loan Case, CBC NEWS, May 12, 2006; Daw, supra note 25
(describing police action against one payday lender in Manitoba). The standard product issued by
the large lenders apparently complies with those laws by offering the borrowers the option of
repaying loans in cash with only 60% interest. If the borrower is unable to repay in cash, the
lender cashes a check (charging the standard payday loan rate as a check-cashing fee) and uses
the proceeds to repay the loan. Dollar Financial Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 18-19
(Aug. 31, 2005) (emphasis added).
It remains to be seen whether the adoption by the Canadian Payday Loan Association of a
voluntary code of compliance will stem criticism. The Code of Best Business Practices (available
at http://www.cpla-acps.ca/files/code_en.pdf) bans, among other things, rollover loans and tied
products. It does not, however, specifically regulate the basic rates that members charge, which
is the basis for much of the existing litigation. The situation is now drawing substantial attention
at
the
federal
level,
where
the
Standing
Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce has published a detailed report concluding
that the spread of payday lenders is “alarming, since we do not believe that they are adequately
regulated.” Consumer Protection in the Financial Services Sector: The Unfinished Agenda 79
(June 2006). For a lucid and balanced discussion of the Canadian situation, see Jacob Ziegel,
Payday Loan Bedlam Cries out for Legal Fix, NATIONAL POST, Mar. 15, 2006, at FP23.
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Tex. Fin. Code § 303.009 (ceiling based on twice the federal T-bill rate that floats
between 18 and 24% per annum).
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however, had a special statute to permit low-dollar consumer finance transactions,
referred to as “cash advance loans.” 107 The problem, however, is that this statute does
not authorize charges at a level typical of the standard payday lending product.
Specifically, the maximum charge it permits is capped at a fixed fee of $10 plus $4 per
month per $100 of cash advance. So, for a loan of $300 for two weeks (a typical
product), the maximum fee would be $16, 108 much less than the $45 fee the typical
payday lender would charge based on a $15/$100 fee schedule. Accordingly, Texas is
listed prominently on the CFSA Web site as a state with laws “that are unfavorable” to
the industry. 109
Yet, when we review annual reports for the large national providers, we discover
that most of them – Advance America, Cash America, Ace Cash Express, Dollar
Financial Corp., and QC Holdings – have locations in Texas. 110

Indeed, several

companies even locate their principal offices in Texas. 111 As it happens, in each case the
annual reports indicate that the lenders do not operate directly in Texas; rather, they
operate using rates imported through their partnering with an out-of-state bank, most
often County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. 112 As discussed above, the FDIC’s
decision to stop this kind of rate importation has driven County Bank and similar banks
from this business. Thus, it appears that Texas and similarly situated states will have an
107

Tex. Fin. Code chapter 342.
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$10 + (0.5)($4)(3).
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CFSA,
States
Respond
to
Emerging
Industry,
available
http://www.cfsa.net/govrelat/pdf/states%20respond%20to%20emerging%20industry.pdf.

at
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We should also add two regional publicly traded providers with a substantial presence
in Texas, EZCorp and FirstCash.
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First Cash Financial Services, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 10, 2005);
Cash America International, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 14, 2005).
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E.g., Dollar Financial Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 11 (Aug. 31, 2005).
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opportunity in the next few years to make a real choice whether to tolerate payday
lending. 113
(c) True Prohibition
The final existing regulatory outcome is outright prohibition. A good example
here is New York.

New York’s general usury limit is 6% per annum, 114 with an

exception that permits banks to charge 16% per annum. 115 What raises our interest,
however, is the utter absence of New York locations from the annual reports of the large
national providers. Not a single one of those providers appears to have locations in the
State of New York.
Interested in how this can be so – given the ease with which bank-partnered
providers have operated so readily in the State of Texas – we spoke to an officer in the
New York Attorney General’s Office responsible for usury enforcement. His perspective
is that New York has managed to exclude payday lenders only through conspicuously
aggressive enforcement. Thus, he is quite confident that the large national providers
113

There is one particular problem that Texas regulators face, which arises from Texas’s
odd credit service organizations statute, Texas Fin. Code ch. 393. That statute permits brokers to
charge a fee for finding credit for distressed borrowers. It has found favor in recent years as a
vehicle for consumer lenders to avoid usury restrictions by charging a brokerage fee that is
parallel to the standard interest charges lenders would charge. Indeed, as we understand it based
on interviews with the Office of Texas’s Consumer Credit Commissioner, most payday lenders
operating in the State as of 2006 rely on this structure. See Erick Bergquist, One More Reason to
Pursue Alternate Models in Payday, AMERICAN BANKER, Feb. 28, 2006 (discussing reliance on
credit service organization model by national providers losing their bank partners but wishing to
continue operations in Texas); Hutchings Interview, supra note 53. Surprisingly enough, the
Fifth Circuit recently has validated this apparently evasive tactic. Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378
F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004) (dismissing RICO claims brought by borrower from car title lender). It
remains to be seen whether the Texas courts would adopt the same view, especially if the
litigation was brought by the Office of the Consumer Credit Commissioner rather than a private
plaintiff. There also is the likelihood that the Texas Legislature might explicitly close this
loophole entirely as part of payday lending legislation currently under consideration.
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N.Y. C.L.S. Gen. Obl. § 5-501.
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N.Y. C.L.S. Bank § 14-a(1); see Seidel v. 18 East 17th Street Owners, Inc., 598 N.E.2d
7 (N.Y. 1992) (discussing the relative “severity” of New York usury laws).
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know that they would face litigation immediately if they opened stores in New York. In
his view, the out-of-state national providers, even if they rented charters from an out-ofstate bank (like County Bank), could not possibly prevail because the loans in fact are
made by the national providers, not by the banks. 116 The difference, it seems, is not in
the usury limit but in the ability of regulators to bring and prevail in litigation to enforce
them. As the rent-a-charter era closes, it should be even easier for states like New York
to repel the national providers, if they choose to do so. 117
III. POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON PAYDAY LENDING
If we are correct, the rapid growth of payday lenders, coupled with the end of the
rent-a-charter era, presents state legislatures and policymakers with a sharply defined
opportunity to decide the terms, if any, on which payday lending should be tolerated.
Existing scholarship has provided little guidance for policymakers wrestling with those
questions. Scholars generally have proposed increased regulatory oversight based on the
assumption that regulation, or even prohibition, is self-evidently desirable. In our view,
the rationales for regulating payday lending markets are difficult to assess. We try here
to sketch what seem to us the most obvious arguments for, and against, different
rationales for regulation.
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This argument was successful in Georgia, where a state statute designed to prevent
rent-a-charter operations in the state bars rate importation if the bank’s local agent retains more
than 50% of the revenues (which apparently always is the case in these relationships). Efforts by
the large national providers to enjoin operation of the statute as preempted failed at the trial court
and before a panel of the 11th Circuit, before the case ultimately was dismissed as moot.
Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (2006).
117

Consider, for example, Betts v. McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., 879 So. 2d 667
(Fla. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a payday loan was usurious because it was consummated
before Florida adopted its deferred presentment statute to validate the industry).
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In general, we suggest three perspectives that policymakers might adopt. First,
policymakers might conclude that the market is inherently objectionable, and thus that
laws should be enacted that in practice prohibit payday lending. As discussed above, this
is the approach in New York. Several other states in the United States, the Australian
state of Tasmania, France, and Germany also adopt this regulatory posture. 118 Second,
policymakers might conclude that the industry should be tolerated, but only if it can
succeed without depending on a regular practice of repetitive lending.

Third,

policymakers might conclude, on balance, that the market should be tolerated, but they
might believe that the potential for abuse is sufficient to justify some form of intrusion or
supervision of the market. Regulated tolerance of some form has been chosen in the bulk
of American jurisdictions, the UK, and most Australian jurisdictions. 119 We note in
passing the possibility that policymakers might conclude that the costs of any plausible
regulatory intervention are likely to exceed the benefits, and thus that no regulation is
appropriate. That approach has not found favor in any jurisdiction of which we are aware
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While some Australian states allow payday lending, Tasmania has banned it. See D.
Wilson, supra note 43, at 39 (citing a 48% cap in New South Wales, Victoria, and the Australian
Capital Territory and describing Tasmania’s prohibition). In France, the Code de la
Consommation sets out the procedure for establishing ceilings on rates each quarter at 1/3 above
the average market rates, Code de la Consommation art. L313-3 (2002), and in Germany, key
judicial decisions in 1978 and 1980 established the rate ceilings at, as a rule of thumb, twice the
national average rate for the type of loan. DTI Report, supra note 5, at 8. These rate caps
effectively eliminate payday lenders from both France and Germany. Id. at 16, 40 (explaining
that high risk borrowers in France either use state owned pawnbroking services or credit cards);
id. at 16 (noting that Germany has no subprime lending options).
119

The British Consumer Credit Act allows courts to review transactions after the fact.
See infra note 204. In Australia, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code covers the overwhelming
majority of these transactions. Under the UCCC, payday lenders must disclose the APR in
advertisements and before entering into the loan agreement. Unif. Consumer Commercial Code,
2001 §§ 14, 15, 143 (Austl.). Also, the UCCC empowers courts to review unconscionable
interest rates, id. § 72, and to reopen unjust transactions. Id. § 79.
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and thus we do not discuss it in detail. Rather, the sections that follow provide a critical
analysis of the first three perspectives.
A. Should Payday Lending Be Banned?
1. The Case Against Payday Lending
The case against payday lending, although not often articulated, is easy to discern.
Like most consumer financial transactions, payday lending transactions tax the cognitive
capabilities of the typical customer in ways that lead to market failures of one sort or
another. Thus, a person with normal experiences, normal time constraints, and normal
intelligence does not easily evaluate the risks and rewards of a payday lending
transaction. Several points are apparent. First, the customer is likely to encounter some
difficulty in forming an accurate estimate of the costs of the transaction. If the lender is
forthcoming, the customer might well understand the specific fees directly attendant on a
successful transaction: perhaps a $30 fee to borrow $200. The customer is less likely to
be sure, however, of costs that might relate to an unsuccessful transaction. For example,
if the check given to the payday lender in fact bounces when it is deposited, the
customer’s depositary bank is likely to assess a fee in an amount unknown to the
customer standing at the payday lender’s retail counter. More generally, the customer
might have a poor understanding of the costs the customer would incur if the customer’s
failure to repay the payday loan ultimately results in financial distress. To make matters
worse, there is every reason to think that typical decision-making problems like the
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availability heuristic and the optimism bias will cause the consumer to give inadequate
weight to the risks that the transaction will turn out poorly.120
Similarly, there is some reason to be concerned that customers will do such a poor
job of comparing alternative lending transactions that the market will not force prices to a
competitive level. For one thing, customers will have great difficulty comparing the pros
and cons of the products that compete against payday loans. For example, it requires
considerable sophistication to compare a depositary bank’s overdraft product to a payday
loan. The customer would need good estimates of the number of checks the customer
would be likely to bounce, as well as a good way of aggregating overdraft fees and
discounting them to an interest rate that the customer could compare to the effective
interest rate on a payday product. Because the effective rates in both cases really would
depend on accurate forecasts of the customer’s use of the products in the future, even
accurate disclosures of the applicable fee structures would not make that task easy. 121
Moreover, even for the customers focused on comparing alternate payday lending
products, there is little reason to be sanguine about the robustness of competitive forces.
Research indicates that payday lenders almost uniformly charge the highest rate
permissible in their jurisdiction. 122 Nothing suggests price collusion or monopolistic
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See generally, Edward L. Glaeser, Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus, and the Law
and Economics of Consumer Choice: Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133
(2006).
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But see BAIR, supra note 22, at 29 (concluding that payday customers do compare
costs between payday loans and overdraft fees based on evidence that customers use payday loans
to avoid overdrafting their accounts).
122

Id. See also Chessin, supra note 17, at 409 (presenting evidence that about 90% of
lenders in Colorado charge the statutory maximum rate); Chin, supra note 67. at 741 (“In states
where the interest rate cap was relaxed to encourage competition, the price of small loans did not
go down, as predicted by fair market proponents. Instead, rates clustered at the cap set by state
legislatures.”).
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concentrations within the market, 123 but several other factors likely account for the lack
of price competition. For starters, a point we discuss in more detail below, 124 the
disclosures that the Truth-in-Lending Act requires in this market operate principally to
confuse consumers and aggravate the difficulties of comparison shopping. It also is true
that borrowers that require money immediately may have a limited taste for price
shopping. 125 This problem is exacerbated by the small size of the loans, which makes the
gains from even a major difference in price quite small as an absolute matter. 126
Perhaps the most serious competitive problem comes from the market structure.
As discussed above, it is widely thought – at least by the large national providers – that
location is of paramount importance. 127 Thus, the retail store that is most conveniently
located for a particular customer’s residential and commuting patterns has a strong
advantage over all other stores. Moreover, because the profitability of an individual
location depends on building a relatively large portfolio of transactions and customers,
there is a natural limit on the density with which profitable locations can be established.
That limit necessarily hinders the effectiveness of price competition.
123

BAIR, supra note 22, at 29.
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See infra notes 222 – 239 and accompanying text.
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BAIR, supra note 22, at 29.
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John Pottow suggests an apt analogy to tipping on small checks, where many of us
routinely round up to the nearest dollar even if it results in a percentage tip that is far beyond our
normal practices on substantial purchases.
127

Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 10. See, e.g., First Cash Financial Services,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 10, 2005) (“Management seeks to locate new stores
where demographics are favorable and competition is limited.”); id. at 7 (“The Company believes
that the primary elements of competition in these businesses are store location . . . .”); QC
Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Mar. 31, 2005) (“We believe that the primary
competitive factors in the payday loan industry are store location and customer services.”); Ace
Cash Express, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17 (Sept. 7, 2005) (“We believe that the
principal competitive factors in the check cashing and short-term consumer loan (also known as
payday loan) industry are location . . . .”).
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For some, the failure of market forces to drive prices to a competitive level would
be an adequate basis for governmental intervention. The basic argument, articulated most
effectively by Stewart Macaulay and Art Leff, and previously applied by one of us to the
credit card market, 128 is that a government inappropriately cedes regulatory power to a
private enterprise when it allows businesses to define the terms of commerce with
consumers in realms in which competitive forces do not constrain the terms.
For others, however, the patent futility of crafting regulatory solutions to all
instances of market failure will make it important to identify some harm from the market.
In the consumer credit area, the harm comes from the financial distress that attends poor
decision-making by customers in the market. 129 Specifically, there is good reason to
think that financial distress generates costs for society as a whole that are not borne by
the parties to the transaction. Thus, the loss from financial distress does not end when a
single creditor fails to obtain repayment from the loan that it has advanced. Rather,
financial distress has a series of broader effects. It increases the burden on the social
safety net: those in distress are unlikely to contribute funds to support the social safety
net, but are quite likely to draw on the resources others have contributed. This is
particularly true if financial distress leads to illness; some data, principally in work by
Melissa Jacoby, 130 suggests such a link. Those in financial distress are likely to have
trouble finding gainful employment, which means that the rest of us will not receive the
128

See Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899 (2006)
(discussing Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read – Business Run by IBM
Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1966) and Arthur
Alan Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144 (1970)).
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This paragraph summarizes an argument made in more detail in Chapter 5 of RONALD
J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD (2006).
130

See Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry,
30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560 (2002)
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positive spillover effects that accrue to us from the exercise of their human capital.
Finally, financial distress is likely to impose costs on dependent family members.
In sum, the best case against payday lending is that the market is plagued by
cognitive failures, unlikely to be well-policed by competitive forces, and likely to
generate external costs borne by the rest of society. It is simply not plausible, the
argument goes, that a person of ordinary capacity sensibly would decide to borrow
money at a rate of 400%, using a loan that in most cases is likely to remain outstanding
for months if not years. In assessing the weight of that problem, it bears noting that those
who will be harmed by the market failure are systematically likely to be far from the top
of the distribution of income and wealth.
2. The Case in Favor of Payday Lending
As the discussion in Part II suggests, a majority of American jurisdictions in
recent years have adopted legislation that specifically authorizes payday lending. It
would be Pollyannish to suppose that the legislators that voted for those bills carefully
evaluated the relevant social interests. Still, several arguments support that legislation,
three of which seem substantial to us: the benefits of permitting lending; the relatively
weak link between lending and financial distress; and the likelihood that a ban on payday
lending will lead to shifts to credit products that are relatively worse for borrowers who
would otherwise use payday loans.
(a) The Benefits of Allowing Payday Lending
The first point is simple, reflecting a general suspicion of wholly paternalist
intervention in consumer credit markets. The one thing that we know for sure about
payday lending is that it is attractive to a large number of consumers in the Western
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economies that tolerate it. The product’s rapid growth is not limited to the United States,
but also is apparent in Australia, Canada, and the UK as well. 131 Moreover, because the
overwhelming majority of payday lending transactions do not result in a default on the
part of the borrower, there is some reason to think that many of those transactions benefit
both the borrower and the lender.
It is easy for upper-middle-class academics that study the topic to think that this
lending is unduly risky and that those that engage in it would be better advised to tighten
their belts and resist the temptation to borrow. It will be much less clear to the borrower
– almost by definition a person struggling to make it from paycheck to paycheck – that
the transaction involves a luxurious excess. We of course know very little about exactly
what the customers of payday lenders do with the funds that they borrow. Surely some of
them use the funds on vicious habits that reflect poor choices, but we can be just as sure
that some of the borrowers are responsible individuals using the funds to purchase food
or medicine. 132
(b) Payday Lending and Financial Distress
The second point focuses on a weak link in the discussion above, which assumes
that toleration of the payday lending market substantially increases the incidence of
131

The first payday lender appeared in Australia in 1998, and by 2001, 82 payday lending
businesses were offering 12,800 loans a month. D. Wilson, supra note 43, at 34. Though
currently a small industry, experts predict it will grow along the same lines as the United States.
Id. at 11, 33. In Canada, one survey reports that nearly a million Canadians, about one in every
32 people, have used a payday loan at least once. Richard Brennan, Nicole MacIntyre, & Jim
Rankin, Ontario Has Begun Payday Lender Probe: Loan Industry Is Unregulated, TORONTO
STAR, June 22, 2004, at A-17. There are more than 1,200 payday lending stores in Canada, and
reports estimate that payday lending generates more than a billion dollars a year in revenue. Jim
Rankin & Nicole MacIntyre, Loans Firm Curbed, TORONTO STAR, August 31, 2005, at A-1;
Acorn Canada, Special Report, Protecting Canadian’s Interest: Reining in the Payday Lending
Industry 2 (2004).
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See supra note 6 (discussing the available evidence).
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financial distress. Although there must be some transactions in which the additional
funds available from a payday lender tip the scale, these small loans probably are not
contributing substantially to financial distress and insolvency. A comparison to the credit
card market – where the relationship between card use and financial distress is
pronounced – is illuminating.
First, unlike credit card lending, payday lending has a limited potential to spiral
into escalating levels of borrowing. Thus, we would not expect to see files of bankrupt
borrowers with tens of thousands of dollars of claims from payday lenders. Credit card
lenders often hold claims of that size, but payday loans by the nature of the business are
self-limiting – they are not going to grow to an amount that equals the expected takehome pay from the borrower’s next paycheck. Indeed, in most of the jurisdictions that
have adopted authorizing statutes, the statutes include a specific maximum cap – like the
cap in the Michigan statute.133 When coupled with a reliable database of all providers,
those provisions should prevent payday lending from contributing to the spiral of everincreasing indebtedness that is such a major part of the problem with credit card debt. 134
Thus, one way to think about the payday loan is that it is, at worst, a second,
relatively small unsecured line available to consumer borrowers after they have maxed
out their credit cards. Perhaps the availability of this line will lead some borrowers to
wait longer before they surrender to an inevitable bankruptcy, but that effect seems much
less significant than the effect of the often much larger credit card line behind which the
payday lender will come. Indeed, it is possible that the payday loan could help speed the
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Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2153(1).
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For discussion of such databases, see infra text accompanying note 198.
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bankruptcy filing, because the borrower could use a payday loan to borrow the funds
needed to file for bankruptcy.
(c) Forcing Borrowers into Worse Markets
The most important concern for us, however, is the secondary effects of a ban on
payday lending. The point of such a ban is to keep the customers from borrowing funds
because of insufficient financial planning. The core problem, however, is that a ban is
unlikely to keep customers from borrowing. Rather, the evidence suggests, it well may
cause them to borrow from sources that provide products that are less beneficial –
products that consumers are more likely to avoid in markets that tolerate payday lending.
We start from a premise that the desire of consumers to borrow is to a large
degree a function of economic development. 135

Roughly speaking, the appetite for

consumer credit is going to be the same in economies at a similar stage of economic
development. Governments can take steps to ensure that the credit is made available in
ways that benefit society as much as possible and harm those that use the credit as little
as possible. 136 But it is, generally speaking, quite difficult to prevent customers from
borrowing by eliminating a particular method of extending credit. Thus, for example, the
effect of Japan’s longstanding ban on credit card lending by banks was not to bolster the
frugality of the Japanese populace.
135

Rather, it was to enhance the market share of

MANN, supra note 129, ch. 10.

136

The Talent-Nelson Amendment is a case-in-point. The military would take away the
product that the military personnel are using without either addressing the conditions that make
the product attractive or facilitating a more reasonably priced alternative. The 36% rate caps
likely will make the national chains inaccessible to military families. We can expect to see those
families depending more heavily on subprime credit cards, pawn shops, rent to own providers,
and unlicensed payday lenders, all of which in the long run are likely to be worse for those
families than the prohibited payday loans. Interviews with representatives of large payday
lending firms suggest that military personnel are only about 1% of their customers and that those
personnel (and their dependents) will be immediately excluded from their customer base.
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Japanese consumer lending held by relatively unsavory nonbank lenders. 137

More

broadly, a recent study by the U.K.’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) bolsters
that intuition with its finding that consumer demand for borrowing in countries with
usury ceilings was the same as demand in countries without ceilings — the same number
of people required credit and people generally had the same aggregate level of debt
service to income ratios. 138
As the example of New York discussed below illustrates, it is far too simple to
suggest that usury regulation can never drive out high-cost borrowing.

It is true,

however, that it requires two things that few jurisdictions have: both a broad and
inclusive usury statute (so that lenders cannot easily flee to substitute transactions that are
unregulated) and an aggressive enforcement regime (so that lenders cannot simply
operate unlawfully but “below the radar”). 139
Working from the premise that in many jurisdictions risky lending will not be
eradicated, the natural question is where consumers are going to get the funds if they
can’t get them from payday lenders. Some might say, echoing a prominent Australian
commentator, that “the risk of borrowers turning to less reputable fringe credit providers
does not seem enough to justify the continuation of current practices in the payday
lending industry.” 140

In our view, however, a fair look at the evidence makes that
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DTI Report, supra note 5, at 10, 12.
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As we discuss in the concluding pages of this Article, sensibly chosen usury limits can
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conclusion fairly debatable. To us, the evidence makes it at least possible that the
consumers that have made payday lenders so profitable have done so for one general and
rational reason: the products of payday lenders provide a better mix of benefits and risks
than the competing products consumers would choose if payday lenders were banned.
The most persuasive source here is the DTI report, which concludes a survey of European
and American markets with this view: “Where low-income borrowers have more than
one credit option, consumers’ choices in relation to lending models appears rational on
both cost and utility grounds.” 141 Though scholars in many jurisdictions – Canada, 142
Australia, 143 and of course the U.S. 144 – often assert that low income borrowers act
irrationally when they use payday loans, they have not provided evidence to support
those assertions. A quick glance at five of the leading alternatives to payday lending
shows the sense in Jim White’s perspective: “I think even the poorest consumers are quite
savvy. They understand the alternatives and make choices about borrowing that are wise
for them even when the decisions seem foolish or wasteful to middle-class observers.” 145
•

Banks

An effective attempt to ban payday lending might have a happy ending if banks
filled the place of fringe payday lenders who currently provide credit to subprime
borrowers. Michael Barr has made sound recommendations for products that banks
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could offer to compete with payday lenders. 146 And Sheila Bair’s recent extensive report
on banks’ potential role in payday lending provides a thoughtful and promising analysis
of several business models that banks might use to operate profitably in this market. 147
We remain skeptical, however, that banks could fill the place of payday lenders without
substantially duplicating the product payday lenders offer.
For one thing, history suggests that banks will not operate in these markets unless
they are permitted to charge higher rates. For example, before consumer credit was
deregulated in the United States, banks would not make small, unsecured, high risk loans
to borrowers because of the high transaction costs associated with such loans. 148 In
Germany and France’s strict rate cap environment, high risk borrowers are simply
excluded from accessing credit – banks do not fill in the gap left by payday lenders. 149
To be sure, as the Bair Report discusses, there have been numerous policy
initiatives in this country designed to support active participation by depositary
institutions. 150

But for the most part, the low-rate programs that the Bair Report

discusses (involving rates in the range of 12%-20% per annum) are not profitable. 151
Those we have spoken to in the industry assert with great confidence that banks will
profit from a payday lending product that undercuts the existing market only by hiding
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For instance, neither the Windward Community Federal Credit Union’s product,
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back-end fees or tying the product to some other service on which the bank profits
substantially. At bottom, the problem is that the payday lending product competes
directly with the overdraft product,152 and banks that wish to market the overdraft will
not want to offer unprofitable or break-even short-term lending products.153
Moreover, borrowers likely have little to gain by shifting to the overdraft product.
The overdraft is characterized by cascading fees – a fee in the range of $20-$30 for each
check that the customer bounces each month. 154

The payday product, by contrast,

contemplates a single fee, in the same range, that covers an advance for the entire
remainder of the payroll period. Upon payment of that single fee, the customer can use
the funds to pay each of the obligations that would have resulted in separate overdraft
fees. Admittedly, the interest rates on the payday lending product are high. But the
product has two advantages over the overdraft product. First, most importantly, it seems
fairly clear that overdraft products are more expensive than payday lending products.
They often escape criticism largely because existing regulations in this country treat those
products as if they do not involve credit, 155 even when they are marketed in a way that
contemplates regular advances. Second, related to the first, the payday lending product
(especially as we envision it in the discussion below) is relatively transparent, with a
price that is simple for customers to understand. The overdraft product, by contrast, is
152

See supra note 146.

153

BAIR, supra note 22, at 34 (“Why offer a small dollar line of credit linked to a
checking account at an 18 percent APR if a bank can collect many multiples of that by assessing a
$17 to $35 fee each time a customer overdraws his/her account?”).
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at 164.
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much harder for customers to price, if only because it so often will be difficult for them to
predict when they are issuing checks that will bounce.
Because all payday lending customers have some bank account – an account on
which their repayment check must be drawn – there is certainly the potential for bank
competition. In the end, however, the message we take from the Bair Report is that
regulators and banks that work very hard on this problem might develop the ability to
serve with profit some small number of the less troubled customers of payday lenders.
The costs of branch banking are likely to make it hard for banks to compete directly
against the most sophisticated payday lenders, who will be able to establish highly
dispersed retail locations more cheaply than banks.
•

Subprime Credit Cards

Another obvious possibility is the subprime credit card. If payday loans were
banned, at least some payday lending customers could shift to subprime credit card
products. This is perhaps the most perverse outcome. If forcing customers to overdrafts
is bad because they are expensive and opaque, shifting consumers to credit cards is much
worse. 156 Also, as discussed above, we assume that many payday lending customers are
already using credit cards to their fullest extent. Thus, it seems unlikely that a ban on
payday lending would result in a shift to credit card lending. Rather, it would result in a
shift to the less appealing products discussed in the three sections that follow.
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•

Pawnshops

In our view, one of the first places consumers would turn if payday loans were not
available would be to pawnshops. 157 Pawnshops operate by giving consumers a loan in
exchange for a possessory interest in a piece of personal property. The interest becomes
an ownership interest after a specified period if the consumer is unable to repay the
principal and interest on the loan. John Caskey’s classic and comprehensive 1994 study
of pawnshops details the boom in pawnshops during the 1970s and 80s. 158 Caskey found
that borrowers use pawnshops because they have no other alternative source of credit. 159
The product bears the obvious disadvantage, as compared to the payday loan, that
an adverse financial outcome results in the direct and permanent loss of personal property
of the consumer. 160 Moreover, because consumers typically will have no right to the
surplus from sale of repossessed property, the ultimate costs are likely to be considerably
more than the stated interest rate would suggest. 161 In a normal secured loan, a secured
creditor can sell the collateral if the debtor defaults on the loan.162 If the sale generates
157

There is some debate about whether payday lenders and pawnshops serve the same
constituency. Dean Wilson argues that, in Australia, pawnbrokers and payday lenders do not
serve the same consumers because only 15% of people taking out payday loans had used
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more money than the amount of the debt, however, the creditor must return the excess to
the borrower. 163 In a pawn transaction, the borrower pledges a piece of property in
exchange for money, but the borrower is never obligated to redeem the property 164 and
cannot be held liable for the debt.165 But if the borrower does not redeem the pledge by
paying back the loan and fees, the property is simply forfeited to the pawnbroker, 166 and
the borrower has no right to any surplus value the pawnbroker acquires through the
borrower’s forfeiture. Given the likelihood in most cases (at least in the U.S.) that the
property would be exempt from execution, the lost property would have been protected
even in the event of a bankruptcy proceeding, if only the consumer could have borrowed
funds from an unsecured lender like a payday lender.
There is some reason to think that consumers recognize these problems. Thus, the
DTI report summarizes evidence that U.S. consumers choose payday lending over
pawnbrokers precisely because payday loans do not require surrendering assets. 167 A
similar distaste for pawnshops apparently obtains in the U.K., 168 although it is “doorstep”
lending rather than payday lending that is the fringe lending product of choice. 169
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Nor is there much reason to think that consumers benefit by lower interest rates.
Loans made by pawnbrokers generally have interest rates at least as high, if not higher,
than payday loans. For instance, title loans, a form of pawnbroking where the consumer
gives a security interest in his or her car to the pawnbrokers in exchange for a loan, can
have APRs of 977%. 170 There is evidence that pawnshops similarly fail to solve the
problem of habitual borrowing, as Caskey found that 70 to 80 percent of pawnbrokers’
business was repeat customers. 171
There is also a general sense that the step from the payday lending market to the
pawnbroker market is a step toward a less reputable lender. Publicly held companies
operate fewer than 6% of total pawnshops in the U.S., 172 whereas an increasing share of
payday lending locations are operated by a group of large publicly traded companies. 173
At least in the U.S., this is associated with a stigma against pawn shops: “[T]he
[pawnbroking] industry has difficulty shaking the ‘pawnbroker stigma.’ The composite
image of the pawnbroker is that of a shady, unkempt, over-weight character working out

discussing an inquiry into anticompetitive practices,
commission.org.uk/inquiries/current/homecredit/index.htm.
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http://www.competition-
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Drysdale & Keest, supra note 161, at 598-99. Of course, just as with payday lending,
it well may be that a focus on the nominal interest rate is misleading. To a pawnshop customer,
what is important is the customer’s personal valuation of the goods being pawned, and the
customer surely understands that the goods will be lost unless the customer can repay the loan.
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CASKEY, supra note 158, at 42. On the other hand, pawnshop lending bears the
advantage (compared to payday lending) that the product is less likely to enmesh the borrower in
the long string of repetitive interest payments for the same loan than the payday product – if the
borrower can’t redeem the pawn it will lose the pawn, but it won’t continue rolling the loan over
until it has paid the amount of the obligation several times over.
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of a filthy, run-down back street hock shop . . .

providing continuing support to

‘druggies’ and other ‘low lifes’ in exchange for pawns of stolen goods.” 174
•

Rent To Own

In Rent to Own (RTO) transactions, consumers acquire goods, such as televisions
or furniture, in exchange for periodic payments. Consumers either make weekly or
monthly payments to the renting party or, if the consumer cannot make the payment, the
consumer must return the goods. 175 Eventually, the consumer owns the goods after
paying for a specified period. 176

The RTO industry is “a $4.5 billion industry of

approximately 7,500 stores with about 3.5 million customers.” 177 RTO lenders appear to
compete directly with payday lenders. As the DTI report cogently notes, the relation
between RTO transactions and payday loan regulation is demonstrated by the facts that
RTO transactions are permitted in most U.S. states but are concentrated in states with the
fewest other credit options for lower income individuals 178 and are stronger in states with
interest rate ceilings. 179
The consumer preference for payday loans over RTO transactions is quite
sensible. For one thing, RTO transactions are not governed by the Fair Debt Collection
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less professional than payday lenders and because going to a pawnshop reveals a greater
admission of desperation or is more demeaning. D. Wilson, supra note 43, at 79.
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50

Practices Act. 180 RTO transactions functionally require consumers to pay very high
interest rates to obtain goods such as, in one example, paying $1709 to obtain a 20 inch
television with a retail price of under $300. 181 RTO transactions have the undisclosed
processing fees of payday loans 182 and the behavior-driven late fees of credit cards. 183
RTO dealers list retail prices of their goods much higher than the market value of the
goods to confuse consumers. 184

Thus, in a way they have the adverse effects of

pawnshop lending (customers lose their stuff) but the pricing of the product to the
customer is much less transparent (because of the long sequence of payments required to
purchase). Indeed, RTOs might be the worst product for consumers, pairing the most
serious cognitive problems with a risk of forfeiture for nonpayment.
•

Illegal Sources

Finally, when borrowers have no other legal credit options, they will seek illegal
credit options. For instance, evidence confirms that loan sharks remain common in
Australia. 185 Responsible policymakers, like the then Minister of Fair Trading, Judy
Spence, have claimed that banning payday lending would lead directly to individuals
with low incomes patronizing loan sharks. 186 The DTI’s arguably self-interested take on
illegal lending in the U.K. versus illegal lending in France and Germany suggests a
similar relation: “The credit impaired in France and Germany appear more likely to use
180
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illegal lenders than in the U.K. where there are legal credit options for such
borrowers.” 187

Thus, the DTI reports, 3% of UK borrowers admit to using illegal

lenders, as opposed to 7% in France and 8% in Germany. 188 Comparing people who
have been denied a loan reveals an even greater difference with 4% in U.K. admitting
using illegal lenders contrasted with 12% in France and 10% in Germany. 189 If we
assume that illegal sources of credit and the extralegal collection methods on which they
rely are disadvantageous as compared to legal sources, then we should worry about legal
rules that will expand the market share for those products.
*****
We are largely agnostic about the merits of the arguments presented above. In
our view, that discussion is important because policymakers deciding whether to
authorize payday lending should start by deciding exactly why they do – or do not – think
it contributes to the welfare of their constituents. Those for whom the arguments in the
second part of this section are not persuasive should be reluctant to support the spread of
payday lending in their jurisdiction. Those who (like most legislators in this country)
cannot see their way to a complete ban on payday lending should read on to consider
precisely what type of lending they should tolerate.
B. Should Repetitive Payday Lending Be Banned?
A distinct question is whether habitual use of payday loans should be tolerated.
As discussed in Part II, it is clear that rollover payday loans are common in the industry.
187
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Indeed, the Flannery & Samolyk study contemplates that the profitability of the large
national providers might depend on rollover payday loans.190 In some cases, the results
can be startling. For example, one recent enforcement action targets an illegal series of
rollovers in which one borrower paid over $19,500 in interest on a series of loans over
eight years that eventually reached a principal balance of $1,875. 191 This raises the
prospect of an intermediate policy perspective: a State might tolerate payday loans in the
abstract, but prohibit rollover loans. Indeed, this is not a hypothetical perspective. Most
of the States that have adopted legislation authorizing payday loans have modified the
model CFSA statute in ways designed to make rollover lending more difficult.
Unfortunately, as we discuss below, it appears that none of the statutes that prohibit
rollover loans has been drafted in a way effective to prevent customers from becoming
trapped in an indefinite cycle of payday borrowing.
Whether a prohibition on rollover loans makes sense depends, in part, on whether
such a ban would effectively abolish the payday lending market altogether. If a ban on
rollover loans effectively would ban the product entirely (or – which is much the same
thing from a policy perspective – drive all reputable providers from the market), then a
policymaker contemplating a ban on rollover loans should consider its goals.
1. The Case For and Against Banning Repetitive Lending
Many writers – and a good number of legislators – operate on the assumption that
proof that a substantial number of payday loan customers are frequent users selfevidently demonstrates the impropriety of the business. The argument often proceeds as
190

For our discussion of why rollovers play an important role in lender profitability, see
supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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See Washington State Department of Financial Institutions News Release, DFI Bans
Payday Lender from the Industry and Orders Restitution to Consumers (Sept. 11, 2006).
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follows: an example is given of a small loan that a customer has rolled over month after
month, resulting in the customer having paid hundreds of dollars in interest but never
having paid down the principal. 192 From this example, we are to conclude rollovers are
illegitimate.
Yet, the policy basis for that perspective is difficult to articulate. For one thing, if
the total amount of funds extended by the payday lender is capped, 193 it is difficult to
understand why it would matter that the borrower might borrow repeatedly from the same
(or a different) lender. At worst, this indicates that the borrower’s overall debt has
increased, more or less permanently, by the total amount available from a payday lender.
Even in the most dramatic examples—where a customer pays $1000 to maintain a $200
debt over a period of 18 months —the customer’s level of debt never increases beyond
$200. 194
A comparison to credit card borrowing is illustrative. It seems unlikely that many
people that borrow up to twice their annual income on credit cards ultimately pay off the
entire amount of the indebtedness without suffering from the effects of financial distress.
With payday loans, however, if the maximum borrowing is capped at something less than
a twelfth or twenty-fourth part of annual income, it seems at first glance much less
problematic than credit card borrowing.
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See, e.g., Chin, supra note 67. at 729-30 (citing the following example: “[a]fter
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On the other hand, the high interest rates can produce shocking outcomes like the
one discussed above – a loan at the standard $15 rate rolled over for eighteen months.
Can we really believe that the customer is “better” off with that product than it would
have been if it had paid five or ten dollars extra each two weeks to amortize the loan
balance slightly?
Moreover, the structure of the product leads to all-or-nothing transactions –
payoff followed by rollover. Thus, as a matter of framing, the borrower each week faces
a choice between paying $30 to keep the loan for another two weeks and paying $200 to
repay the loan all at once. If the borrower looks each week at the $30, the borrower will
pay inadequate attention to the long-term outcome: $1000 in interest paid for an eighteenmonth loan of $200.
The framing problem also creates perverse incentives for lenders. In a market in
which the generation of a reliable income stream is the game, the lender can be less
concerned with monitoring the likelihood of repayment than with the likelihood of a
paycheck that promises the capacity to make a continuing stream of rollover payments. It
may be a different mechanism than the more familiar model of the credit card issuer, but
the outcome is much the same; the principal difference is that the payday lender need
invest only $200 to generate $60 per month, while the credit card issuer will need to
invest $3000. 195
In the end, the case for banning rollover loans comes down to the policy
implications of the deeply repetitive borrower discussed above.

Is it tolerable for

borrowers to pay the fees of the payday product without any limitation? Even legislators

195

Assuming monthly payments of about 2% of the outstanding balance.
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immune from paternalistic impulses are likely to insist upon some limit on rollover loans.
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the model deferred deposit loan act promulgated by
the CFSA bans more than one direct repeated rollover loan. 196
2. The Mechanics of Banning Repetitive Lending
Turning to the policy choices of existing legislators, a rollover ban is the response
of choice among the States. The great majority of those States that regulate payday
lending have adopted rules that limit repetitive lending by limiting or preventing direct
rollover loans. 197 The problem, however, is that a limitation on rollover loans requires
two additional features if it is to have any effect on repetitive borrowing.
First, the State must maintain a database of all licensed providers, requiring
lenders to consult that database before making loans, and making prohibitions on
repetitive lending applicable to the entire pool of licensees. Without such a database the
borrower that wishes to borrow repetitively need only cycle its borrowings between one
or more lenders, just as a distressed consumer commonly uses cash advances on one
credit card to make a minimum payment required to keep a second card active. These
databases are increasingly common – Delaware, Florida Idaho, Indiana, and North
Dakota all have implemented them in the last few years. 198
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The second necessary feature is a lengthy “cooling-off” period between loans. 199
Those periods also exist in a number of states, with periods ranging from one to seven
days, 200 typically imposed after a long string of borrowing. Indiana’s provision (the most
restrictive), requires a seven-day cooling off period after six consecutive transactions. As
far as we can tell, there is only a single State (Indiana) that has both a cooling-off period
and a limit on repetitive lending that is policed by reference to a state-wide database.
This, then, is the closest any State has come to enacting an effective ban on repetitive
payday lending. And even there, a reasonable skeptic might say, the cooling-off period is
too short to be effective. No period less than fourteen days will ensure that a typical
borrower with a two-week pay cycle is forced to go through an entire cycle without
obtaining funds from a payday lender.
In sum, it seems that most legislatures have determined that some form of an
intermediate policy is the best outcome – restricting or prohibiting the kinds of repetitive
payday lending transactions that indicate that a customer is irretrievably enmeshed with
payday loans. But few (perhaps none) of the legislatures that has taken that policy view
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exceed the maximum loan amount. This possible end-run around the rollover prohibition
prompted the Iowa Division of Banking to issue an interpretive bulletin informing lenders that the
prohibition on rollovers means that they cannot issue a new loan to a consumer until at least one
day after payment of the previous loan. . . . Unlike Iowa, other states have not even tried to clarify
the interrelationship between statutes that prohibit rollovers and statutes that allow multiple
outstanding loans. Therefore, payday lenders in these states may practice rollovers even where it
is technically illegal.”).
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have adopted a legislative system that is likely to have a serious effect on repetitive
payday borrowing.
C. How to Design Regulatory Schemes that Target Abuse
Finally, we consider the view that the payday lending model should be permitted
to function without substantial constraint to the product itself. That does not suggest,
however, that the industry should be immune from regulation. As discussed above, no
American jurisdiction has adopted that perspective. The task, rather, is to define the
purpose of those regulatory schemes, as a precursor to assessing how well they work.
In general, the two most obvious bases for regulation in a jurisdiction that wishes
to allow the product would be (a) to limit the cognitive problems discussed above; and
(b) to limit the likelihood of abusive conduct by lenders. Thus, the discussion above
presents the view that payday lending might be permitted because, in the range of prices
and attributes at which the product typically is offered, the product is attractive to wellinformed customers, particularly when it is compared to high-cost alternatives like
overdraft products and risky products like credit cards, pawnshop lending, and rent-toown. At the same time, even in the jurisdictions that regulate the market, it is hard to
deny that transactions occur on terms outside those normal parameters. 201 This might be
because the lenders charge fees that differ from those that they disclose. This might be
because the lenders charge fees that grossly exceed the specified limits – fees far beyond
the amounts necessary for a well-organized business to profit. Or it might be because the
lenders package the payday lending product with other related products for which they
201

See, e.g., Study: Payday Lenders Continue to Ignore State Laws Related to Fees and
Protections, ConsumersUnion.org, July 2, 2003 (survey of 31 payday lenders in Texas indicating
that none were in compliance with applicable state law), available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_financial_services/000203.html.
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charge unreasonable amounts, all with the purpose of charging fees higher than is
lawful. 202

In general, it is safe to assume, some of this conduct proceeds with an

intention to profit through avoidance of industry norms or legally prescribed limits. The
task, then, is to devise a regulatory regime that will allow legitimate providers to proceed
with as little burden as possible but at the same time hamper the activities of those that
currently operate with flagrant illegality.

Our thoughts on that subject occupy the

remainder of the Article. 203
Logically, the first question in designing a scheme to limit abuse is whether the
abused customers can solve the problem themselves, simply by enforcing their rights
through litigation. 204 For several reasons, that seems implausible. As Iain Ramsay points

202

This seems to have been the preferred practice of the “loan shark predator” discussed
above. See Escobedo, supra note 36.
203

We do not address the problem of regulating Internet payday lending. Our impression
is that effective regulation of that sector will have to come first from Congress. A good place to
start, however, certainly would be a requirement that lenders provide a brick and mortar address
of their headquarters.
204

Other countries purport to regulate payday loans through judicial review. For
example, the British Consumer Credit Act empowers courts to lower interest rates that are
unconscionable or “extortionate and grossly exorbitant.” An Act to Amend the Law with Respect
to Persons Carrying on Business as Money-Lenders, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. 155, ch. 51, §1 (Eng.);
Consumer Credit Act, 1974, 22 & 23 Eliz. 2, ch. 39, §§ 137-40 (Eng.). Similarly, several
Canadian provinces regulate excessive credit charges and credit contracts by allowing courts to
reopen consumer transactions that are unconscionable. See, e.g., Alberta Unconscionable
Transactions Act, R.S.A., ch. U-2, § 2 (2000) (empowering judges to review and alter
transactions in which “the cost of the loan is excessive and . . . the transaction is harsh and
unconscionable . . . .”); Manitoba Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, R.S.M., ch. U20, § 2
(1987) (same); New Brunswick Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, R.S.N.B., ch. U-1, § 2
(1993) (same); Newfoundland and Labrador Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, R.S.N., ch.
U-1, § 3 (1990) (same); Price Edward Island Consumer Protection Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. U-2, § 2
(1988) (same). Also, some Canadian borrowers have sought judicial review of payday
transactions—both individually and through class actions. E.g., Affordable Payday Loans v.
Beaudette, 2004 Carswell Ont. 3210, 2004 WL 1663120 (Ont. S.C.J.) (2004); Jim Rankin,
Borrow in Haste Repay Forever, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 21, 2005, at B-03. The Australian
Uniform Consumer Credit Code similarly empowers courts to review unconscionable interest
rates and to reopen unjust transactions. Unif. Consumer Commmercial Code, 2001 §§ 72, 79
(Austl.).
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out in the Canadian context, “[t]he small amounts at stake mean that few individuals are
likely to litigate in the event of a dispute.” 205 Even if attorneys worked for free or
operated under a fee-shifting mechanism, the small damages involved might not deter
lenders. 206
Moreover, the nature of the customer base makes reliance on litigation
problematic. Lower income people have fewer professional contacts, so it is harder for
them to enforce their rights. 207 In Australia, commentary suggests that “low-income
consumer will not have the resources to apply to court to complain of hardship or
unconscionability.” 208 Even if they had the resources to find attorneys and pay court
fees, studies show “low-income consumers are unlikely to take legal action in relation to
a loan dispute, on the basis of factors such as cost, a sense of powerlessness, and a fear of
acrimonious disputes.” 209 Thus, even recognizing that payday lending customers are not
the poorest segment of the U.S. society, we remain skeptical that direct litigation will
allow victimized customers to enforce regular compliance with articulated regulatory
requirements.
Trying to fill the gap, we suggest a two-part approach. First, we suggest a number
of direct transactional regulations, many (but not all) of which appear in one form or
another in the deferred presentment statutes recommended by the CFSA. 210 Second, and
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Ramsay, supra note 43, at 18.
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Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1587.
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Ramsay, supra note 43, at 19.
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T. Wilson, supra note 2, at 162.

209

T Wilson, supra note 2, at 163-64 (citing GLENN H, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT
PEOPLE DO AN THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 101 (1999))
210

It might at first glance seem odd that a credible regulatory program could rest in large
part on legislation drafted by the interested community, but it seems more sensible if we accept
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of considerably more consequence, we consider indirect actions to enhance the reliability
of the industry by increasing the participation of large and well-qualified lenders.
1. Direct Regulation of the Transactions
Our proposal for direct regulation has two separate features: transparency and
disclosure. First, we would bar ancillary fees and sanctions. 211 The point is to simplify
the fees and sanctions involved in the product to enhance the likelihood that competition
will occur along a few dimensions that customers more easily might understand. Second,
we recommend focusing disclosures on the amount of the fees. The existing interest-rate
based disclosures provided under the Truth-in-Lending Act are more likely to confuse
than to illuminate.
(a) Transparency
One of the difficulties in regulating payday lenders has been the ability of lenders
to add ancillary products and services to the payday lending products. That practice
allows the lenders to avoid statutory limits on fees.
Thus, payday lenders in some cases have avoided fee ceilings by selling insurance
with the credit product, enabling the lenders to comply with rate ceilings while generating
revenue through products that most consumers probably do not want. 212 Another similar

the premise of the last part of this Article: that reputational and capital market constraints will
force the large national providers to behave differently than small mom and pop providers. If the
large national providers can operate more cheaply than the small mom and pop providers, they
benefit from rules that firmly sanction shady corner-cutting, from which the reputational and
capital market constraints (by hypothesis) exclude the large national providers.
211

For a good model provision see the Talent-Nelson amendment, John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Pub. L. No. 109-???, § 670 (to be codified at 49
U.S.C. § 987(i)(3)).
212

For example, Canadian lender Stop N’ Cash used this practice successfully to avoid
Canada’s 60% rate ceiling. Jim Rankin, Payday Lender Wins Insurance Go-Ahead, TORONTO
STAR, November 17, 2004, at A-20. The practice of adding insurance to loans also seems to be

61

practice is to force consumers to purchase advertising space (for sayings such as “Go
Cowboys!”) in the lender’s newsletter 213 or to purchase gift certificates for worthless
products in catalogs. 214 Perhaps more blatantly, lenders simply create new fees and dub
them “membership fees” or “service or administrative fees” that should not count as part
of the interest charged for the transaction. 215 Another recent practice is loan-splitting, in
which a single loan is split into several checks, presumably to present the customer with
at least a threat of multiple check-bouncing fees upon default. 216 A related problem
arises whenever the lenders take checks rather than ACH transfers. It is clear that at least
some lenders use possession of checks as a device to threaten borrowers with the prospect
of prosecution for uttering a hot check. However unlikely such a prosecution might be in
fact, the threat seems at least in some cases to have real bite; it seems unlikely a lender
that used ACH transfers rather than checks could make such a threat effective. 217

prevalent in France, allowing lenders to obviate the strict regulation of the annual percentage rate.
DTI Report, supra note 5, at 7-8.
213

Johnson, supra note 2, at 20-21.

214

Moss, supra note 2, at 1729-30.

215

Jim Rankin & Nicole MacIntyre, Loans Firm Curbed, TORONTO STAR, August 31,
2005, at A-1 (practice in Canada); D. Wilson, supra note 43, at 46 (practice in Australia); DTI
Report, supra note 5, at 7-8 (practice in France and Germany). Dollar Financial Corp. admits in
their Annual Report to engaging in this practice in Canada: “A federal usury ceiling applies to
loans we make to Canadian consumers. Such borrowers contract to repay us in cash; if they elect
to repay by check, we also collect, in addition to the maximum permissible finance charge, our
customary check-cashing fees.” Dollar Financial Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 18-19
(Aug. 31, 2005) (emphasis added).
216

See Washington State Department of Financial Institutions News Release, Check ‘N
Go Faces Fines Totaling over $333,000 and License Revociation (Aug. 16, 2006).
217

Interestingly, the large national providers to whom we have spoken generally prefer
ACH transfers, because the transaction costs of processing are lower than the transaction costs of
processing checks. They also scoffed at the idea that they could profit by repeatedly depositing
checks or by running repeated ACH entries against the customer’s account. In their view, only
the uninformed would view that as a useful threat. Although it would expose the customer to
repeated charges from its depositary bank, it would harm the chances that the payday lender
would collect in two ways. First, because the depositary bank would charge the fees directly
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For the most part, those practices are tolerated in jurisdictions in which
unreasonably low rate caps otherwise would prevent payday lenders from operating. 218
In our view, however, a sensible regulatory scheme would enact limits that would allow
reputable businesses to operate (as discussed in Part II), but would bar payday lenders
from packaging other products or fees with that service. The full cost of any goods or
services purchased contemporaneously with the lending transaction would count against
the applicable fee cap and would have to be disclosed as such. 219 The purpose is a simple
one. If the product and its pricing can be made as simple as possible – so that there is a
single fee 220 – we increase the likelihood that borrowers accurately will understand (and
compare) the cost of borrowing. 221

against the customer’s account (something the payday lender cannot do), the charges would
deplete funds available to the customer to repay the loan voluntarily. Secondly, the activity
would motivate the customer not to repay the loan. Because (in the view of these sources), the
collection remedies of payday lenders are so limited, their main chance of collection from a
customer in distress is by fostering a good relation with the borrower. Antagonistic collection
techniques, in their view, are distinctly counterproductive.
218

Scholars often remark on how payday lenders continue to restructure themselves to
avoid regulation. See Barr, supra note 2, at 158-60 (explaining how lenders expend resources to
avoid low caps by creating inefficient rent-a-charter relationships); D. Wilson, supra note 43, at
46 (Australia); Ramsay, supra note 43, at 5 (Canada).
219

See, e.g., Mich. C.L.A. § 487.2160.

220

To be sure, this recommendation leaves unsolved the problem of overdraft fees
assessed by the customer’s bank when payday lenders unsuccessfully attempt to collect checks
from their customers. Our vision of a single fee is undermined if the banks at which defaulting
borrowers have their accounts impose substantial overdraft fees when the checks that they have
given their payday lenders bounce. Because those banks are not a party to the lending
transaction, however, it is harder to justify regulating the fees that they can charge – these
bounced checks, after all, are not all that different from any other bounced checks issued by their
customers.
221

We are skeptical of Chris Robinson’s proposal for Canada that rates be determined
either by a fixed rate per amount borrowed, plus a set per loan fee, plus an interest rate or by
different fees for different amounts borrowed (e.g., 12% for the first $250 borrowed and 6% for
everything higher than that amount). Daw, supra note 25. Even if this scheme works under
finance theory, we worry that the average borrower would find it difficult to understand these
more complex pricing schemes.
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(b) Disclosure
Requiring parties to disclose information is a common form of consumer
protection regulation. 222 In this context, as discussed above, the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), 223 like similar regulations in countries such as Australia 224 and Canada,225
imposes a uniform interest-rate disclosure obligation on payday lenders. 226
Regardless of the merits of such regulation, several aspects of the payday lending
industry make the current mandatory disclosures counterproductive. The most basic
problem is that TILA communicates the wrong information to borrowers: the annual
percentage rate. While APR may provide a good comparison mechanism for loans
generally, 227 studies suggest that requiring APR disclosures on payday loans is
ineffective. 228 An Australian survey found that 77% of Australians measured the cost of
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See MANN, supra note 129, ch. 13.

223

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2005).

224

Unif. Consumer Commmercial Code, 2001 §§ 14 & 15 (Austl.)., (governing
contracts); id. § 143 (governing advertisements).
225

E.g., Manitoba Consumer Protection Act, R.S.M., ch. C200, § 4 (1987);
Newfoundland and Labrador Consumer Protection Act, R.S.N. ch. C-31, § 16 (1990); Nunavut
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.N.W.T., ch. C-17, § 5 (1988); Price Edward Island Consumer
Protection Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. C-19, § 16 (1988); RSBC 1996 Consumer Protection Act C-69;
Yukon Consumers Protection Act, R.S.Y., ch. 40, § 5 (2002).
226

12 C.F.R. § 226.4.

227

See Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1593 (arguing that APRs are important tools).

228

Graves and Peterson argue the opposite. They claim that APRs are appropriate
because (i) many borrowers roll over loans, so payday loans “often compound for durations
coming close to or exceeding a year”; (ii) “annualized interest rates, [for loans] are the uniform
metric which all mainstream creditors use to compare prices”; and (iii) borrowers would confuse
loan prices quoted “as a percent of the principal borrowed” with APRs from other products.
Graves & Peterson, supra note 15, at 662-63. We find this reasoning unpersuasive. Studies do
not suggest that rollover loans typically extend for a year. At most, Graves and Peterson’s
research established that some borrowers rolled over loans 12.5 times—less than half of a year in
the worst scenario. Id. at 63. Also, even if APRs were useful in mainstream credit (which we
doubt), that does not tell us how we should disclose pricing information to people using fringe
products. It is essential to evaluate the specific credit mechanism in question. As Sunstein
observes: “Because of bounded rationality, some frames will have more of an impact than others.
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their payday loans in a dollar amount, not in an interest rate, 229 suggesting that people do
not think of payday loans in terms of an abstract rate but rather a concrete cost. Evidence
from the U.S. backs this claim up; previous scholars have found that although most
people don’t understand APR disclosures, 230 they do understand the finance charge,
which is a dollar amount. 231
Interest rate disclosures are misleading because the amount of the fee charged
generally does not depend on the number of days until the borrower’s payday. 232 An
interest-rate disclosure would suggest that the rate changes every day depending on
which day in the pay cycle the borrower obtains the loan, when actually the cost is
uniform throughout that cycle. This confusion does nothing to help consumers evaluate
competing products.
The current regulatory scheme is also problematic because consumers often get
the information too late in the process for it to be useful. 233 Most courts merely require
that the lender provide the required disclosure sometime before the contract is signed, but
giving the disclosure immediately before the deal is done does not allow the consumer to
For those who suffer from serious forms of bounded rationality, steps like those in the Truth in
Lending Act may well do little good.” Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 249, 261 (2006). Finally, annualized interest rates are not the uniform pricing guide
in short term “lending”: overdraft fees from banks – a major competitor for payday loans – are
not expressed in terms of APR but in simple dollar amounts.
229

D. Wilson, supra note 43, at 77.

230

Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1591-92.

231

Id. at 1593.

232

Cash America International, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 14, 2005)
(“Cash advances are generally offered for a term of 7 to 45 days, depending on state law and the
customer’s next payday.”); Ace Cash Express, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Sept. 7,
2005) (reporting that loans are made “until the customer’s next payday”). For another example,
see
Ten
Dollar
Payday
Loan.com’s
payment
schedule
at
http://www.tendollarpaydayloan.com/faqs.asp.
233

Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1590-91.
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comparison shop. 234 The Model Deferred Deposit Loan Act supported by CFSA follows
this same pattern. Lenders must disclose the APR, but only when the customer signs the
contract — not before, when the customer might still be interested in price
comparisons. 235 A sensible scheme would require that the basic fee be prominently
posted so that consumers could compare the fees available from different providers
without incurring substantial transaction costs.
Finally, at least presently, there is a substantial problem of noncompliance. A
study of payday lenders in Ohio suggested that 68% of payday lenders either failed to
disclose accurate interest rates or disclosed them inaccurately. 236 In part, a simple desire
to hinder competition may be the cause, 237 but it also surely is attributable in part to the
mismatched disclosure scheme that requires lenders to advertise rates in terms that seem
absurdly high even for relatively mainstream products. 238
The best solution, from our perspective, is to adopt a simple disclosure scheme,
with which reputable lenders readily can comply. We would require lenders to display in
a prominent way the fee per $100 borrowed. This disclosure requirement solves the
problems identified above: it (i) tracks with the survey data that customers use their
234

Bertics, supra note 2, at 148.

235

Model Deferred Deposit Act, supra note 76, § 3.

236

Johnson, supra note 2, at 25.

237

See id.

238

See Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1597; Johnson, supra note 2, at 25. Canadian payday
lenders have also balked at disclosing APRs. Canadian Association of Community Financial
Service Providers, Payday Loan Association Supports Consumer Protection Legislation and
Consumers'
Right
to
Full
Disclosure,
July
29,
2005,
at
http://www.globeinvestor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CNW/20050729/1307295753
(“‘The
Ontario Government has asked all lenders in the province to disclose an annual cost of borrowing,
even if a loan is taken out for only a few days. While this is like asking hotels to disclose a daily
room rate of $200 as an annualized figure of $73,000, we are advising association members to
respect the law and disclose accordingly,’ says Whitelaw.”).
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actual cost to make decisions and not a interest percentage; 239 (ii) eliminates the
confusion caused by different interest rates for different time periods; (iii) ensures
borrowers obtain the information upfront at little cost; and (iv) encourages compliance by
allowing lenders to avoid stating misleadingly high APRs.
2. Indirect Reforms: Fostering a Better Class of Lenders
The preceding sections discuss ways to enhance the transparency of the payday
lending market, hoping to foster some competition through the provision of simple and
accessible information. The central point of our proposal, however, is to draw a line
between “mainstream” payday lending transactions, which are to be tolerated, and extramarket, abusive transactions, which are to be pursued and sanctioned aggressively.
Our proposal for fencing off abusive transactions has two parts. The first is the
simplest – drawing a line between the mainstream payday lending market and the abuses
that involve fees not justified by ordinary costs and competitive pressures. The landscape
of American regulation makes it clear that States can see the difference between
regulatory systems that involve fee caps that close off the market for reputable payday
lending and those with realistic fee caps and ceilings that will permit profitable activity
by reputable lenders. If we are right that mom and pop lenders are both less efficient than
the national providers and also more likely to engage in abusive behavior (as both
common sense and our interviews indicate), a fee cap in the range of $15-$20 could be
quite beneficial, because it might force many of the mom and pop lenders from the
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A glance at the Web sites of Internet payday loan providers suggests both that this is a
piece of information that consumers generally find valuable and, less happily, that providers with
high rates are conspicuous in their penchant for shrouding this figure rather than blazoning it
upon their home screen (or, as with tendollarpaydayloan.com, incorporating it into their domain
name).
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market. 240 This would be particularly true if the cap were combined with an effective
disclosure regime like the one discussed above.
The second part of our proposal is more difficult: encouraging participation in the
market by large and reputable lenders. Although regulators and consumer activists for
the most part have decried efforts by large financial institutions to move into this
market, 241 we urge exactly the opposite approach.

If this market is left largely

unregulated, then numerous benefits flow from having the actors in the market include
the largest and most reputable institutions.242 It may be that such an environment will
lead to participation in the market by large depositary institutions that currently refrain
from participating.243 On the other hand, as the Bair Report suggests, there is some
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Michael Barr has pointed out to us that mom and pop providers strongly opposed the
Michigan statute discussed above because they did not believe they could operate profitably at a
rate of $20/$100. Recently, Chris Robinson, a Canadian finance professor, has proposed a similar
cap on payday fees so severe that smaller payday lenders would be driven out of business and
replaced by large chains and mainstream financial institutions. Daw, supra note 25.
241

Some commentary explicitly condemns the involvement of publicly held companies in
payday lending because such companies allow rich and middle income people to profit from
making unreasonable loans made to the poor. Ramsay, supra note 43, at 4; MICHAEL HUDSON,
MERCHANTS OF MISERY: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA PROFITS FROM POVERTY 2 (1996)
(“There’s another place you can run across the poverty industry these days: Try the stock pages of
your newspaper. More and more, the merchants who profit from the disadvantaged are owned or
bankrolled by the big names of Wall Street . . . .”). Publicly held banks like JP Morgan Chase
already finance payday lenders, so public companies already participate in payday lending. Our
suggestion is that they do so directly.
242

Wells Fargo’s participation as a payday lender suggests that this argument is more
than just theoretical. Wells Fargo’s payday product implements many of the micro-level suggests
we made above: the finance charge is stated in a clear dollar amount ($2 for every $20 borrowed),
the payment is withdrawn automatically from the borrower’s checking account, and rollovers are
limited (a borrower can only obtain 12 consecutive advances before being force to wait a month).
https://www.wellsfargo.com/wf/checking/dda/terms. Wells Fargo also permits borrowers to only
borrow half of the amount of the direct deposit, making repayment more likely. Id. It is not clear
that this product complies with EFTA § 913, because it appears to condition the advance on a
right to collect by a preauthorized funds transfer. Perhaps Wells Fargo could have designed the
product as an “overdraft credit plan” exempt from EFTA coverage, see Regulation E, 12 CFR §
205.10(e)(1), but the actual product description does not provide any support for that treatment.
243

Bertics, supra note 2, at 143-44.
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reason to think that those institutions will never be as competitive in this market as
entities more focused on payday lending and associated check-cashing services. 244 Our
goal, however, is to remove artificial barriers to entry, so that the lenders best-placed to
operate in this market will enter it without reputational or regulatory sanction. If the most
effective financial structure for this industry involves direct participation by large
financial institutions, we think that regulators should consider that premise when
designing regulatory schemes. 245

In our view, the rapid spread of the product and

profitability of the industry suggests that regulators need do little to induce participation
by large well-capitalized companies.
The most obvious benefit of participation by large institutions is that they have
much more to lose from noncompliance. 246 It also is much easier to monitor a small
number of large chains than to monitor thousands of separately operated providers. Also,
large institutions that fail to develop policies that ensure compliance with regulations can
be forced to pay extremely large fines, in an amount adequate to deter misconduct. 247
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See supra notes 150-155 and accompanying text.
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Michael Barr is the most creative and articulate proponent, emphasizing the cost
effectiveness of direct-debit collection by banks as well as the benefits to borrowers of a shortterm lending product that would amortize rather than remain at a fixed balance. Barr, supra note
2, at 163. It is unclear whether such a product can be made profitable. Moreover, as discussed
above, supra note 242, the product might not comply with EFTA § 913. The best answer to that
problem, however, surely would be to amend EFTA § 913 to permit the products in question.
246

This echoes Michael Barr’s point that fines against large entities are more meaningful
because they are more likely to have the capital to pay them. Michael Barr, Access to Financial
Services in the 21st Century: Five Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th
Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 447 (2002). See also Ronald J. Mann,
Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82 TEX. L. REV. 681 (2004). For a related
discussion of why banks are less prone to predatory lending than their non-depository agents, see
Peterson, Christopher Lewis, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by
Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More than They Can Chew? at 25-29
(September 15, 2006), available at, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=932698.
247

This assumes, of course, that the relevant regulators are willing to focus their attention
on issues of consumer protection, where so often in the past they have been concerned solely with
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Large publicly traded companies also must fear the adverse effects on their
market capitalization that are likely to ensue if they engage in behavior that is portrayed
as unpalatable or illegal in the mass media. We have seen this already. For example,
when the OCC and FDIC prohibited payday lenders from partnering with national banks
to avoid unfavorable interest rate caps, the stock price of several publicly-held payday
lenders dropped 10% or more. 248 Similarly, after the corporate scandals of the last few
years, the officers of large entities realistically will fear substantial criminal penalties if
they allow their businesses to operate in a way that does not reflect a serious effort to
comply with applicable regulations.
And prosecutions of larger entities are much more useful as a regulatory matter.
If the government finds a sole payday lending store violating a regulation, the import of a
prosecution is minimal — it only affects the small number of transactions at that store. In
contrast, if a large entity violates regulations in all of its stores across the country,
prosecutors have the opportunity to affect the many transactions at all of these stores by
prosecuting that one entity. In addition, if the number of potential violators is smaller —
i.e., if a small number of entities offer all the payday loans in the U.S. in contrast to the
large number of small payday lenders currently offering loans, the government will be
able to pursue a larger percentage of the violators. One problem with enforcing TILA

capital adequacy and financial stability. The shift of authority to state regulators discussed in the
Introduction offers good reason to think regulators, at least in some States, will focus on these
questions.
248

Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 20 n. 31. Our primary argument is not that
large payday lenders worry that the public might think their conduct is unsavory but rather that
these large providers worry that the public might consider their conduct illegal such that investors
would not consider them strong investments. Yet, to the extent that publicly held companies
account for ethical investors in setting policies, encouraging large providers may curb unsavory
lending practices.
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currently is that the government cannot pursue the numerous TILA violators. 249 Fewer
violators would mean that the government could pursue a greater proportion of them.
Also, prosecuting large companies would have a greater deterrence effect on other
payday lenders than prosecuting small payday lenders. Deterrence is a function of the
actor’s perception of the severity of the punishment and the likelihood of being
prosecuted.

Prosecutions of large companies receive publicity, and publicizing

prosecutions makes would-be violators think that the risk of being prosecuted is greater.
Another noted benefit in enforcing compliance with large companies is that it is
much easier for regulators to monitor the activities of a small number of relatively large
companies than it is to monitor the activities of a large number of small and evanescent
competitors. Aside from the simple economies of scale, publicly traded companies are
more likely to have detailed data about their operations. Finally, the data is more likely
to be reliable than it is for smaller companies unlikely to rely on independent auditors.
All in all, this presents a substantial easing of the task of the supervisory regulator.
A market composed of large actors also solves some of the problems with civil
enforcement noted at the beginning of this section. Because the policies of large entities
often would be uniform across a large swath of transactions, class actions would be a
more viable procedural mechanism for pursuing actions challenging abusive practices.
Although it is harder to be sure, there also is some reason to think that entry into
the market by larger and better capitalized companies ultimately could lead to better
products and prices for the customers in the market. The most obvious reason for this is
that high-quality payday lending, like other developed forms of lending, is a business that
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See Johnson, supra note 2, at 46-47.
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depends heavily on sophisticated information technology and standardized operations for
which there are substantial economies of scale. 250 What little empirical evidence we
have seen suggests that this is a serious issue. 251
To see how this works, consider the annual report of Cash America International,
Inc., one of the largest payday lenders in the United States. 252 This firm has grown
steadily through acquisitions in the past few years, using a simple model in which it takes
over a promising location and then rapidly improves the profitability of the location
through installation of the company’s centralized management and standardized
operations. 253 Other large payday lenders also boast that their proprietary computer
information systems and point of sale technology are pivotal components that increase
their stores’ productivity and allow them to effectively expand through acquisitions. 254
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See Barr, supra note 2, at 157-58 (making a similar argument about consolidation).
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See Morgan Stanley Report, supra note 60, at 16 (using data from several large chains
to illustrate correlation between costs of operation and size of chain).
252

Cash America International, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 14, 2005).
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Id. (“The Company’s growth over the years has been the result of its business strategy
of acquiring existing pawnshop locations and establishing new pawnshop locations that can
benefit from the Company’s centralized management and standardized operations. In 2003, the
Company expanded this strategy to include acquiring existing cash advance locations and
establishing new cash advance locations.”). See also, Dollar Financial Corp., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 6 (Aug. 31, 2005) (noting that “our centralized support centers is a competitive
advantage”).
254

First Cash Financial Services, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 10, 2005)
(“The Company utilizes a proprietary computer information system that provides fully integrated
functionality to support point-of-sale retail operations, inventory management and loan
processing. Each store is connected on a real-time basis to a secured off-site data center . . . .”).
See also, Dollar Financial Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Aug. 31, 2005) (“Our
proprietary systems are used to further improve our customer relations and loan servicing
activities, as well as to provide a highly efficient means to manage our internal as well as
regulatory compliance efforts.”); id. at 16 (“The point-of-sale system, together with the enhanced
loan-management and collections systems, has improved our ability to offer new products and
services and our customer service.”); Ace Cash Express, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5
(Sept. 7, 2005) (“To better service our customers and manage our stores in the most profitable
manner, we have developed proprietary information systems, including a point-of-sale system
and a management information system, designed for the efficient delivery of our financial
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The problems for smaller companies are easier to see. Smaller companies are less
likely than the larger players to have ready access to credit services, such as TeleTrack, to
determine if applicants have other outstanding payday loans or credit problems. 255
Smaller companies are less likely to have specialized central processing, which seems to
be highly efficient in this industry. 256 Indeed, because the larger companies for the most
part are companies that have other products (check-cashing services being the most
common), the ability to spread administrative costs over more locations and products
seems to be quite important. For example, Ernst & Young’s study of Canadian payday
lenders confirms that lenders with different types of products and not just payday loans
had significantly lower costs per $100 of payday loans. 257 In the end, the data we have
about the industry – principally from the FDIC study (in this country) and the Ernst &
Young study (in Canada) – strongly suggest that economies of scale give the larger
lenders lower costs of doing business, and thus higher profitability. 258
One last consideration relates to the way that payday loan transactions interact
with the credit reporting system.

Because payday lenders do not report positive

transactional data to the three large consumer reporting agencies, there is a concern that
the payday borrowers will not form credit histories that would facilitate mainstream

services with the proper balance of corporate management. Our in-house information systems
team has built a reliable and scalable technology infrastructure that will allow us to grow our
business without significant additional capital expenditures. . . . By implementing our Operational
Goals and information systems, we are typically able to increase revenue and gross margin in our
acquired stores and to enhance the acquired stores’ service offerings.”).
255
256

Id. at 151.
See Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 11 (describing such costs for payday

lenders).
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E&Y Canada Study, supra note 25, at 34.
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Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 2; E&Y Canada Study, supra note 25, at 46.
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borrowing. This issue gained prominence with the passage of the FACT Act. 259 Section
312 of the FACT Act requires the FTC and federal banking agencies to prescribe
guidelines to ensure the accuracy and integrity of information furnished to consumer
reporting agencies. 260 Section 318 requires the FTC to conduct an ongoing study of the
accuracy and completeness of consumer credit reports and to report on four specific
topics related to credit report accuracy, including of relevance here whether there are any
common financial transactions not generally reported to the CRAs that would provide
useful information in determining a consumer’s credit rating. 261
The first interim report emphasized that information related to utilities and rent
payments would be most likely to address the problem of “thin” credit reports; the report
mentions payday lending in passing, but does not suggest that the information would be
sufficiently predictive of creditworthiness to make its omission a matter of concern. 262
This makes sense, given the limited information about creditworthiness to be gained from
a pattern of payday borrowing and repayment. Still, a requirement to report information
to the national credit bureaus would advantage the large national providers, because their
access to information technology allows them to comply at lower costs.
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Academics also have noted this problem. See Barr, supra note 2, at 121; see also
Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 997 (2006).
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FACT Act § 312, Pub. L. No. 108-159 (2003). As part of that process, these agencies
have solicited comments on the types of errors, omissions and other problems that may impair the
accuracy and integrity of information provided to consumer reporting agencies, including the
omission of “potentially significant information about the consumer account or transaction, such
as credit limits for or positive information about the account.” Federal Trade Commission,
Interagency Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. 14,419 (2006).
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FACT Act § 318(a)(2)(D), Pub. L. No. 108-159 (2003).
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FTC, Report to Congress Under Section 318 and 319 of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transaction Act of 2003 80-82 (December 2004), available at www.ftc.gov.
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The real problem is that the market for consumer borrowing currently falls into
two starkly different sectors: credit card borrowing and unsecured bank lending, both of
which operate with interest rates in the range of 15-30%; and payday lending, which
operates with interest rates in the range of 400-500%. There is little reason to think that
the risk profiles of consumer borrowers justify the rate discontinuity between those
sectors. Rather, the distinction is that the borrowers whose needs cannot be met with the
highly specialized products offered by banks in the 15-30% ranges are lumped into a
single category in which the principal criterion that currently is evaluated is the
possession of a few recent pay stubs, with a single (high) rate charged to all in the
category.
The challenge is to encourage some lenders to offer products that fill that large
gap. The existing initiatives all have started with mainstream lenders that have tried to
offer products with prices slightly higher than their existing mainstream products, but
targeted at the very risky pool that presently purchases the high-priced payday lending
product. The problem with that approach is that it involves lenders that are unfamiliar
with the customer base and the products that are attractive to that base attempting to
design products that will be both safe and desirable to those customers. That is not an
impossible task, but it is an ambitious one.
History suggests that a more fruitful approach would be to start with the entities
that already know the customers and what they want. In an ideal world, competition
among sophisticated entities could force the providers of the very expensive product to
develop ways to carve out less risky segments of their customer pool, charging them ever
lower prices. In the credit card industry in the last two decades, this approach has
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resulted in a highly segmented array of interest rates, which includes a marked lowering
of interest rates for customers that are relatively creditworthy. There is every reason to
think that the same advances information technology has brought to the credit card
industry in this country could be useful in the payday lending industry as well. Thus, our
hope is that a set of large profit-oriented entities, with free rein to deploy information
technology to learn more about characteristics of their customers that relate to the
likelihood that they will be profitable could do the same to that industry.
IV. CONCLUSION
Payday lending regulation should respond to the problems that require
intervention. In that vein, this Article has three goals. First, we look at the facts. By
engaging empirical studies and the annual reports from the leading businesses in the
industry, we are able to provide a balanced description of the business and economics of
payday lending and its alternatives. Although existing empirical research fails to answer
many of the important questions, it does allow us to provide some insight into why
consumers rationally might prefer the product to its alternatives and how businesses can
profit from lending to those consumers. Our balanced approach allows us to recommend
more pointed inquiries for future empirical research.
Second, we try to provide more careful analysis of the regulatory alternatives than
the existing scholarship.

If legislators can be brought to think clearly about the

alternatives before them and choose regimes that have the potential to accomplish their
policy goals, we would be less likely to see legislation that is unenforced or ineffective on
its face.
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Finally, and most importantly, we hope to counteract the existing hostility to an
active role in this market for large publicly traded providers. If this market is to be
tolerated, the market should be populated by large companies motivated by the
reputational constraints that attend participation in the public finance markets, not the flyby-night operators that are so common today.
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